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Legal language is not a descriptive language. It is a directive,
influential language serving as an instrument of social control.
The "hollow words" are like sign-posts with which people have
been taught to associate ideas concerning their own behavior
and that of others.
To serve as an instrument of social control legal language is
and must be a regularized and repetitive language. The hollow
words can function as signposts only if they are in, some way
authoritatively established as such and used in accordance with
some rules .... -Olivecrona, Law as Fact (2d ed. 1971).
This unfortunate species of property is constantly presenting
us with cases involving considerations of policy rather than law,
and in which little assistance can be derived from author-
ity.-Nott, J., Wingis v. Smith, 3 McCord (S.C.) 400, 401
(1825).
I. INTRODUCTION
It has often been observed that lawyers make bad historians
due to their overemphasis of the importance of legal doctrine on
* Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.S., Loyola University of Chicago; J.D., De-
Paul University; LL.M., New York University.
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the dynamics of an historical event. On the other hand, historians
without a law background too often overlook the long term im-
portance of the technical aspects of case law or other authorita-
tive legal data buried under layers of esoteric legalese.' A
legal/historical event should be examined not only from the refer-
ence point of the content of cases decided in response to it but
also from the methodological perspective-how it was decided
within the enveloping context of legal rules and concepts utilized
by courts in their position as conflict resolvers. Such an examina-
tion is of great importance in achieving a full understanding of
the possible ranges of judicial response to the underlying event.
This Article is considered an experiment because it focuses on
the technique utilized by courts in the ante-bellum South in re-
solving selected slave-related tort damage suits and actions in
equity for the specific delivery of slaves. It does not analyze di-
rectly the economic or social roots of the slave labor system, of
which such cases are a reflection. By taking the institution of
slavery as a given fact and examining the courts' methodological
response to the myriad legal issues raised by the social fact of
property in human beings, it is hoped that some light will be shed
on issues traditionally addressed by historians.
It too often is overlooked that the common law resolution struc-
ture itself has a dramatic effect, often a limiting one, on a court's
response to a social issue brought to its attention through litiga-
tion. This is especially so in the area of tort liability, with which
this Article mainly is concerned. Regardless of the real-life nature
of the human conflict situation underlying anticipated litigation,
counsel must choose from a very limited number of channeling
concepts-negligence, intent, or strict liability - with which pre-
liminarily to label or characterize the conduct of the defendant.
Once an overall channeling concept has been selected, the
ensuing court response invariably will center on more limited
aspects of the case contained within subconcepts regularly em-
1. Historian Leonard W. Levy, in his fine study of the influence of Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW (1957), relegates to foot-
note mention, Shaw's famous decision in Brown v. Kendall, 6 Mass. (Cush.) 292 (1850).
This case, which launched the principle of no liability without fault on the American
continent, is mentioned in passing as an interesting case on the issue of contributory
negligence. Id. at 319 n.42.
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ployed as part of the doctrinal machinery utilized in such cases
-duty, proximate cause, etc. Aside from its de-emotionalizing
and pidgeon-holing effect on the dynamic of the precipitating
human event, the existence of such doctrinal machinery limits
the ability of a court to respond fully to the underlying problem.
The result is that such concepts or "hollow words," regularly
utilized in all cases of any generic type, create what might be
deemed a structural lock on decision making.2
The problems posed by this legal phenomenon were especially
evident in the decisions rendered by courts in the ante-bellum
South in noncriminal slave-related cases. This was because
Southern courts, utilizing the conceptual framework andpreced-
ent base of English common law, were attempting to construct
one legal system to guide decision making in all cases of any one
generic type. Cases involving slave property continually inter-
fered with this task. They required a choice between the creation
of a specialized parallel system of rules for slave property or the
adjustment of the framework of the received common law to the
institution of slavery.
There was an obvious and primary need for uniformity in the
construction of a common law-private law system in these fledg-
ling states. There was also the pressing responsibility to integrate
slave property into any such system. It is the author's hypothesis
that the methodological struggle to achieve such integration af-
fected the task of constructing a private law system due to the
inherent "channeling concept" nature of the common law resolu-
tion structure. This hypothesis, unfortunately, must await fur-
ther research for verification or refutation. The initial task, and
the focal point of this Article, is the description of selected as-
pects of the slave property integration efforts by courts in the
ante-bellum South.
A great deal has been written on the subject of slavery in the
United States, but the emphasis has been on the political, eco-
nomic, social or moral aspects of the question.3 Little has been
2. The author has examined the inherent limitation set by conceptual language on
decision as it applies to modern cases in the area of products liability. See Kiely, The Art
of the Neglected Obvious in Products Liability Cases: Some Thoughts on Llewellyn's, The
Common Law Tradition, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 914 (1975). That Article, as this one, owes a
heavy debt to the work of Professor Karl Llewellyn.
3. Several recent publications merit special attention. R. FOGEL & S. ENGERMAN, TIME
[Vol. 25:842
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written on the purely legal side of the issue,4 more particularly the
day to day workings of the courts in slaveholding jurisdictions in
the context of the received common law tradition.' The purpose
of this Article will be to examine selected aspects of the private
law side of slave jurisprudence and to analyze the difficulties en-
countered by the courts in their attempt to mold the contours of
the common law around the institution of slavery. The subject is
an extensive one and hence a certain selectivity in topical analy-
sis has been necessary.' No general attempt has been made to
analyze the statutory provisions relating to the criminal respon-
sibility of a slave, the criminal culpability of a master or other
white for the willful killing or infliction of serious harm on a
bondsman, nor the political implications flowing from such
legislation.'
The judges made their mark in the interpretation and rapid
adaption of the noncriminal side of the common law to the insti-
tution of slavery, not in the application of the myriad provisions
ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN SLAVERY (1974) utilizes computer oriented
methodology called "cyclometrics" and provides fresh insights into the daily realities of
the slave labor system.
For a fresh and scholarly examination from a Marxist standpoint, see E. GENOVESE,
ROLL JORDAN ROLL (1976); E. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE (1969); E.
GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1967). These three works are particularly
relevant to the overall study of the law of slavery in regard to private law disputes.
4. In the last several years, articles have begun appearing that deal with various as-
pects of the issue in its relation to law and judicial activity. See, e.g., Alpert, The Origin
of Slavery in the United States-The Maryland Precedent, 14 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 189
(1970); Horowitz, Choice of Law Decisions Involving Slavery: "Interest Analysis" in the
Early Nineteenth Century, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 587 (1970); Nash, Texas Justice in the
Age of Slavery: Appeals Concerning Blacks and the Antebellum State Supreme Court, 8
HoUSTON L. REV. 438 (1971); Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the
State Supreme Courts of the Old South, 56 VA. L. REV. 64 (1970); Nash, Negro Rights,
Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina Court of Appeals: The Extraordinary
Chief Justice John Belton O'Neall, 21 S. CAL. L. REv. 141 (1969). For a study of the
changes in judicial style necessitated by northern courts' desire to support the anti-slavery
movement see Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV. 513 (1974).
5. See Stealey, The Responsibilities and Liabilities of the Bailee of Slave Labor in
Virginia, 12 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 336 (1968) for an analysis of early Virginia statutory
measures on the subject.
6. The author is in the process of preparing papers on other aspects of the non-criminal
side of the law of slavery. The topics discussed infra have been chosen due to their
relevance to the basic issue of judicial methodology in this area.
7. Interesting and thoughtful attention is paid to several of these issues by Nash, supra




of the so-called Black Codes. The answers to a greater number of
questions regarding the role and function of the courts in but-
tressing the institution of slavery will be found by a study of their
creative work in this area. Reference will be made to certain
policy measures and criminal decisions, but only insofar as they
shed light on the civil difficulties flowing from human chattel-
hood.
Courts, in private cases, utilized the skeletal conceptual frame-
work of the received common law, fleshed out by an immediate
and continual infusion of the "living law" or custom. ' The greater
number of cases involving slaves brought before the courts were
civil and, with the exception of Louisiana, the private law was not
codified. Therefore, judges had little choice but to attempt to deal
with such issues within the confines of the common law legal
system that enveloped their and counsels' daily professional lives.
At a first reading, the case law dealing with the institution of
slavery, viewed from the retrospect of over a century, tends to
shock the sensibilities. After devoting some time to the subject,
however, one realizes that here, perhaps more than in any other
area of historical-legal studies, one must assiduously avoid infus-
ing into an earlier day current views of morality. As noted by
Professor Karl Llewellyn when discussing law and social science
methodology:
What is needed is not, of course to throw the world of Ought out
of the window and concentrate exclusively upon the description
of what is. A descriptive science in the social field is not. enough.
Yet without a descriptive science which describes, we make no
advance; and without keeping description uncontaminated by
our desires and ideals we acquire no clean-limbed descriptive
science.'
It must be recognized that, in general, the men functioning as
judges in the ante-bellum South were believers in the system and
8. It was during these same years that John Austin, the English positivist, reached his
conclusion that custom was positive morality as opposed to positive law and therefore not
a fit subject for jurisprudential study. J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (1885).
Eugen Ehrlich's concept of the "living law" as the foundation of the legal order of
human society and the well-spring of authority for concrete legal norms offers keen in-
sights when applied to the judicial activity in a law of slavery. E. EHRLICHI, PRINCIPLES OF
THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Moll transl. 1936).
9. 1 K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (1962).
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all that went along with it. To a court charged with the responsi-
bility of adjudicating slave-related societal conflicts, the concept
of slaves as chattels brought to the surface a multitude of meth-
odological difficulties.
The relatively business-like approach of many of the decisions
generally reveals the legal technician searching for a methodol-
ogy, not the Southern firebrands depicted by Northern abolition-
ists. "' Some Southern jurists continually used the published re-
ports to preach the Christian necessity of slavery to their North-
ern detractors." The greater number of them, however, were con-
cerned more with developing doctrinal machinery with which to
adjudicate the numerous issues brought to them for resolution
because of the social fact of property in human beings.
A necessary starting point in the study of judicial influence in
giving economic and societal credibility to the South's peculiar
institution is an examination of the first conceptual hurdle to be
cleared by the courts: where to find principles with which to
build, in a common law legal environment, a body of slave juris-
prudence.
II. THE SEARCH FOR LAW
[Llet it be remembered, that we sit here, not to censure or
reprove the errors or crimes of any age or country, but to deter-
mine a naked question of law upon legal principles .... -
Nesbit, J., Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 583 (1851).
[Alt every turn, we find these questions complicated in the
framework of society, by peculiar considerations, not referable
to the common law, or governed by its analogies .... -
Watkins, C.J., McConnell v. Hardemann, 15 Ark. 151, 156
(1856).
Due to the early abolition of slavery in England, no developed
10. Judge George M. Stroud of Philadelphia and Reverend William Goodell of Boston,
Northern abolitionists, culled selections from the statutes and reported judicial opinions
of the slaveholding jurisdictions, as source materials for abolitionist literature. See discus-
sion at note 17 infra.
11. Chief Justice Lumpkin of Georgia and Justice Harris of Mississippi made the most
consistent use of judicial opinion to set out the philosophy of the slaveholding states in
answer to abolitionist attacks. See text accompanying notes 99-100 infra.
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body of common law dealt with the fine points of ownership in
slave property. 2 In the latter part of the eighteenth and early
days of the nineteenth century, court and counsel in the slave-
holding states searched for a conceptual vehicle with which to
settle the growing amount of litigation arising in a social and
economic milieu revolving around the institution of slavery. 3
Slave related disputes involving principles of private law ac-
counted for only a small percentage of the cases presented to
southern courts. It cannot be forgotten that property in slaves was
a business, and hence, the focal point of a steady stream of eco-
nomically related civil suits. Courts in the ante-bellum South
were faced with the dilemma of adjudicating a plethora of unique
questions of law within the confines of a legal system that pro-
vided no ready answers. To lawyers and judges trained and prac-
ticing on a daily basis within the conceptual framework of the
common law, the problem was a grave and continuing one. 4
From the earliest times, the contest for supremacy between the
ancient Roman law,' 5 with its wealth of principles relating to
slave property, and the received or adapted common law
tradition is evident. The issue was raised in virtually every case
of first impression where the court faced the problem of adjusting
a dispute which would have been readily soluble by reference to
the common law if the case had involved nonslave property."
12. In England, Lord Mansfield outlawed slavery in his famous opinion in Somerset v.
Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772). This decision effectively halted the development
of case law defining the adjustments necessary to existing private law principles when
dealing with slave property.
1:3. See K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956), [hereinafter cited as STAMPPI for
figures delineating the percentage of slaves in terms of total population, based on the 1860
census. The growth of the slave population in the original slave states, plus its expansion
to the Southwest, kept a steady pressure on the courts by reason of the increasing amount
of litigation involving business disputes. Id. at 203.
14. Cases involving slave property, while numerous, formed only a small percentage of
the total number of cases filling daily dockets in the slaveholding jurisdictions. Thus, the
greater portion of judicial energy was expended in interpreting and refining the received
common law to meet local needs having no relation to the slave labor system.
15. Arguments of counsel based upon the civil law were usually gleaned from the most
readily available texts, namely, J. TAYLOR, ELEMENTS OF THE CIVIL LAWS (1755); T. COOPER,
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (1841); and, on occasion, A. BROWN, A COMPENDIUS VIEW OF THE
CIVIL LAW (1802). While arguments were continually based, in the alternative, on civil law
principles as contained in the above texts or the Code Noir of Louisiana, counsel devoted
most of their energies to contesting the issue in terms of the more familiar common law.
16. Even after solutions to the more pressing private law problems were shaped by the
[Vol. 25:842
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This factor of a known, taught, and otherwise quite satisfactory
common law framework for conflict resolution is of prime import-
ance for a proper understanding of the legal difficulties encoun-
tered in this area of the private law.
The key element in the methodological struggle under discus-
sion lay in the dual aspects of a slave's legal status. 7 Questions
courts, arguments based upon the principles of Roman law were still vigorously urged by
counsel.
17. In all of the slaveholding jurisdictions, to varying degrees, the slave was considered
a person for some purposes and a chattel for others; This unavoidable duality of status
gave rise to the incessant search for a method that occupied court and counsel in slave-
related cases in the ante-bellum years.
Four contemporary works treated this aspect of the law of slavery in varying degrees of
comprehensiveness, two having been written for use by practitioners in the slave jurisdic-
tions and two for the benefit of northern abolitionists. These works merit brief attention
here because their publication indicates that the law as traditionally taught and practiced
required extensive adjustment when dealing with questions relating to slave property.
From the practitioner's standpoint, a text setting out the approaches used in this area was
felt to be essential. To Northern detractors, such solutions served as one more example of
the moral vacuum existing in the slaveholding states, and provided an interesting outlet
for abolitionist rhetoric.
The publications of the latter type, G. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO
SLAVERY IN SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNITED STATES (1827, reprinted 1968) and W. GoonEi.1.,
THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1853, reprinted 1968), written under
the auspices of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, are pamphlets. In the
main, they consist of outraged analyses of selected statutes and court decisions from the
slave states, believed to be illustrative of the aid and comfort given the slavers by the
Southern bench and bar.
The remaining works, J. WHEELER, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SLAVERY (1837,
reprinted 1968), and T. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA (1858, reprinted 1968) [hereinafter cited as COBB] were prepared as
treatises for use by practicing attorneys. As noted by Thomas Cobb, the official Georgia
reporter and a practicing lawyer, the only other works of that nature theretofore published
were those of Judge Stroud and Jacob Wheeler. Of these he had the following to say in
his preface:
I enter upon an untrodden field. Stroud's "Sketch of the Law of Slavery," is and
was intended only as an Abolition pamphlet; Wheeler's "Law of Slavery" pro-
fesses to be only a compend of abridged decisions on prominent questions. An
elementary treatise, purporting to define the Law of Slavery as it exists in the
United States, has not been brought to my notice.
COBB, at preface ix. The Wheeler text, in effect a digest written by an enterprising New
York court reporter in the midst of the development of an American common law of
slavery, is somewhat useful as early source material. Unfortunately, it lacks the flavor and
content of the Cobb book, written by a man sold on the 'system and actually engaged in
practice in a slaveholding jurisdiction. Cobb gives no attention to the problem of metho-
dology and devotes most of his efforts, after a cursory discussion of a slave's civil and
political rights, to the topics of conflict of laws problems applied to the escaped slave issue,
slave suits for freedom, and the issue of manumission.
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regarding the status of a slave as a person'" or as a chattel'9 con-
tinuously arose. Early decisions utilized several conceptual ave-
nues of approach in the course of attempting to resolve disputes
raised by both aspects of the status issue. Prior to the eventual
resolution of the problem in the private law area by acceptance
of the common law conceptual framework, fleshed out by a con-
stant reference to custom, jurists looked to history in their search
for a uniform guide to action.
In addition to the Roman law, it was asserted that the law of
slavery should be based on that governing lord and villein in
feudal England,2" that the principles of English law governing the
relationship of master and apprentice should control,' or even
that "the true state of the slave must be ascertained by reference
to the disabilities of an alien enemy, in which light the heathen
were anciently regarded." 2 The continual oscillation between
arguments based on the Roman law or available techniques
within the common law historical corpus cannot be grasped fully
without drawing fairly fast lines between cases involving the legal
Unfortunately for current scholarship, Cobb's goal of preparing an elementary treatise
was not reached. The first 228 pages of the work are devoted to the history of slavery in
the known world, plus an analysis of voluminous scientific, philosophical and religious
tracts, demonstrating to the author's mind the inevitability and absolute Christian ne-
cessity of subjecting the African Negro to a condition of permanent servitude. The remain-
ing 317 pages contain a discussion of the law relating to slaves as persons. In a second
volume, Cobb had planned to deal with the variations in property rights and liabilities
necessitated by the fact of the slave's status as a chattel. Due to the onset of the Civil
War and the ensuing abolition of slavery, it was never completed.
18. Those most litigated involved questions as to a slave's political and social rights,
his criminal responsibility and the criminal responsibility of a master, bailee, or other
white for the willful infliction of death or serious bodily harm upon a slave.
19. The more numerous problems arose from unique difficulties in the law of tort,
contract, agency, and equity.
20. Fields v. State, I Tenn. 155 (1829). See also CoBa, supra note 17, at 87.
21. CoB, supra note 17, at 87-88.
22. Fable v. Brown, 2 Hill 378, 391-92 (S.C. Ch. 1835). Permeating the entire issue is
the fact that most courts and juries were composed of owners of slaves, and that their
charge, dutifully executed, was to protect the interests of the slaveholding community.
This was a social fact not lost on court and counsel in cases where the spectre of chaos
was raised as the probable result of an adverse ruling:
When it is recollected, that our Courts and Juries are composed of men who,
for the most part, are masters, I cannot conceive that any injury can accrue to
the rights and interests of that class of the community.
Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678, 690 (1827) (Brockenbrough, J., dis-
senting).
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issue of a slave's status as a person and those examining his status
as property. In cases where the technical legal issue went to the
very heart of the master-slave relationship, with its potentially
explosive social ramifications, great care and attention was given
to alternative non-common law methodologies. Hence, the deep-
est judicial soul-searching and greatest abandonment of common
law technique was reserved for that block of cases revolving
around the slave's status as a person.
A. The Slave As A Person
In the cases involving the criminal responsibility of a master or
other white for the death or disabling injury of another's slave,
the common law, with its troublesome references to the willful
infliction of death or serious injury to a "reasonable creature, ' 3
was almost" uniformly rejected." While this general approach
23. Murder is when a man of sound memory and of the age of discretion,
unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm, any reasonable creature "in
rerum natura," under the king's peace, with malice aforethought, either express
or implied ....
:3 COKE, INsTrru'rEs 47 (Thomas' COKE, 1836). See also 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES* 194.
The issue of common law liability arose because legislatures failed to draft statutes suffi-
ciently comprehensive to deal with the varied slave property problems which developed.
24. Several early decisions maintained, usually by analogizing slavery to villeinage in
England, that the common law in this regard did apply to slaves:
I disclaim all rules or laws in investigating this question, but the Common Law
of England as brought to this country by our forefathers when they emigrated
hither, and as adopted by them, and as modified by various declarations of the
Legislature since . . . .If, therefore, a slave is a reasonable creature, within the
protection of the law, the killing of a slave with malice prepense is murder by
the Common Law.
State v. Reed, 2 Hawks. 454, 455-56 (N.C. 1823). See also Kelly & Little v. State, II Miss.
(3 S. & M.) 518 (1844); Fields v. State, 1 Tenn. 156 (1829); State v. Jones, 1 Miss. (Walker)
83 (1820).
25. As stated by Justice Harris of Mississippi in George v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 320
(1859):
With the exception of this last case [Fields v. State], the cases of Kelly &
Little v. State .. .and The State v. Jones . ..in our state, and one or two
very early cases in North Carolina, founded mainly upon the unmeaning twad-
dle, in which some humane judges and law writers have indulged, as to the
influence of the "natural law," or "civilization" and Christian enlightenment,
in amending, proprio vigore, the rigor of the common law, and on a supposed
analogy between villanage [sic] in England and slavery here, the cases and
text-writers are uniform in declaring that slavery, as it exists in this country,
was unknown to the common law of England, and hence its provisions are
inapplicable to injuries inflicted on the slave here.
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allowed the imposition of criminal penalties by the interpreta-
tion of whatever statutory provisions there were regarding slave
deaths,6 it nevertheless amounted to a basic retreat from the
common law principles of criminal responsibility as a decisional
vehicle in slave-related cases. At the same time, such principles
were being used on a daily basis in cases of the killing of one white
by another. 7
Contemporaneously, and of prime importance in the eventual
development of property status concepts, other less dramatic as-
pects of the slave's status as a person were also settled by the
courts with equal firmness. A keen awareness of social realities
was the fulcrum for decision. Courts, in the absence of legislative
guidance, turned to the general principles of the Roman law,
since most statutory measures relating to a slave's personal status
were based on such principles.
An early decision discussing the noncriminal aspects of a
slave's personal status, setting the tone for the future resolution
of the property issue, was rendered by the Supreme Court of
Alabama in the 1819 case of Bynum v. Bostwick."5 After holding
that a slave may not take property by descent or purchase and
that hence a legacy to a slave fails due to his incapacity to take
it, the court made the following remarks regarding the personal
status of a slave in the United States:
The condition of slaves in this country is analogous to that of
the slaves of the ancients, the Greeks and Romans, and not that
See also Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555 (1851); Commonwealth v. Turner, 26 Va. 678 (1827).
The former case is an interesting example of the depth of analysis made in the criminal
area, consisting of 30 pages devoted in the main, to the history of slavery in the known
world.
26. CoHB, supra note 17, at 84-86. However, as noted by Cobb, in regard to defenses
under such statutes:
It would seem that from the very nature of slavery, and the necessarily degraded
position of the slave, many acts would extenuate the homicide of a slave, and
reduce the offence to a lower grade, which would not constitute a legal provoca-
tion if done by a white person.
Id. at 92.
See also State v. Cheatwood, 2 Hill 461 (S.C. 1834) (minor assault by slave accepted in
mitigation of offense); State v. Tackett, 1 Hawks. 210 (N.C. 1820) (insolence of slave
accepted in mitigation of the offense).
27. State v. Tackett, I Hawks. 210 (N.C. 1820).
28. 4 Desaus. 266 (S.C. Ch. 1812).
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of the villeins of feudal times. They are generally speaking not
considered as persons, but as things. They can be sold or trans-
ferred as goods or personal estate . . . . Almost all our statute
regulations follow the principles of the civil law in relation to
slaves, except in a few cases, wherein the manners of modern
times, softened by the benign principles of christianity, could
not tolerate the severity of the Roman regulations.29
One of the Roman regulations that had to give way to modem
times and "principles of Christianity" was the matter of the
peculium, whereby the Roman slave was allowed to accumulate
a certain portion of his earnings, with which he often gathered
together substantial amounts of property.' Such amounts were
also utilized by the Roman slave to trade or buy his freedom. The
issue of the peculium arose and was settled, along with most
others regarding a slave's personal status, in another Alabama
decision, Brandon v. Planters & Merchants Bank,3 sixteen years
later.
The slave of one Brandon, during the latter's absence from the
city, found $2,190 in bank notes, a tidy sum in 1828, and showed
them to two white men lounging in the town square. The men
took the notes from the slave and deposited them in the Hunts-
ville bank in their name, pending an investigation as to the true
owner, who was never located. Brandon, upon returning to the
city, learned of the find and, after being refused the notes by the
bank, filed a successful action of trover for the latter's conversion
of his treasure.
The court rejected a lengthy argument by counsel for the bank
that the status of slaves was akin to that of villeins, and that, per
Lord Coke in Coke on Littleton, property acquired by a villein"
29. Id. at 267.
30. COBB, supra note 17, at 235, 238-39. Cobb maintained that the South had a counter-
part to the Roman peculium which itself was voluntary on the master's part, in the
discretion vested in the master toward his slaves as to small gifts. The State of Louisiana
formally allowed the peculium by statute. Id. at 235 n.3.
31. 1 Stew. 320 (Ala. 1828).
32. Also, if a villain purchase land, and aline the land to another before that
the lord enter, then the lord cannot enter; for it shall be adjudged his folly, that
he did not enter, when the land was in the hands of the villain .... And so it
is of goods. If the villain buy goods, and sell or give them to another before the
lord seiseth them, then the lord may not seise the same.
1 LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND §§415, 416.
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and disposed of prior to seizure by the lord was beyond his con-
trol. They reaffirmed the ruling in the Bostwick case and then
discussed the subject of the peculium:
[W]ith respect to commerce, our slaves can do nothing in their
own right, can hold no property, can neither buy, sell, barter or
dispose of any thing without express permission from the master
or overseer; so that everything they can possess or do, is in legal
contemplation, on the authority of the master.33
Hence, the possession by the slave of the notes, even for a mo-
ment, was the possession of the master. The owner of the notes
never having been found, the bank was guilty of conversion.
To round out the majority opinion, Judge Crenshaw, in a sepa-
rate opinion, declared that:
[I]n this country a slave is in absolute bondage; . . . he has no
civil rights and can hold no property except at the will and
pleasure of his master; . . . his master is his guardian and pro-
tector, and all his rights, acquisitions, and services are in the
hands of his master. 34
However, since a slave was not a beast, but a rational human
being endowed with volition and understanding like the rest of
mankind, whatever he lawfully acquired and gained was the pos-
session of the master.
The Bostwick and Huntsville Bank cases are representative of
decisions delineating aspects of the personal status of a bonds-
man outside of the graver issues regarding the responsibilities of
whites for serious crimes of violence involving slaves. These
broader legal issues being settled, nagging questions regarding
personal status still remained as to the relationship between mas-
ter and slave in their day to day functioning in the economy. The
answer, in an opinion more florid than the relatively businesslike
approach of the Bostwick and Huntsville Bank decisions, was
supplied by Judge Thomas Ruffin of North Carolina in his fa-
mous ruling in the 1829 case of State v. Mann.35 The decision is
of importance here since it is one of the earliest cases that met
the issue of personal status head-on and resolved, finally, any
33. Brandon v. Planters & Merchants' Bank, I Stew. 320, 321 (Ala. 1828).
34. Id. at 343.
:15. 13 N.C. 263 (1829).
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remaining questions relative to a slave's status as a person. In
effect, a judicial "hands off" policy36 was adopted as regards the
daily contacts between master and slave, a policy of vital import-
ance to the economic feasability of the slave labor system.
Mann had hired a slave from his owner for one year and, during
an attempt at chastisement, the slave ran and was shot by him.
The owner brought criminal charges of assault and battery
against Mann and a conviction was obtained in the lower court.
Judge Ruffin began his opinion by expressing the anguish experi-
enced by a judge in such cases due to the conflict between per-
sonal feelings and official duties:
A judge cannot but lament, when such cases as the present are
brought into judgment. It is impossible that the reason on which
they go can be appreciated, but where institutions similar to our
own, exist and are thoroughly understood. The struggle, too, in
the Judge's own breast between the feelings of the man, and the
duty of the magistrate is a severe one, presenting strong tempta-
tion to put aside such questions, if it be possible. It is useless
however, to complain of things inherent in our political state.
And it is criminal in a Court to avoid any responsibility which
the laws impose."
Judge Ruffin then proceeded to analyze the legal relationship
between master and slave in an opinion that caused a furor in
abolitionist circles and was uniformly damned up to the Civil
War as the best evidence of the iniquity of the Southern bench
and bar.3"
[Tihe end [of slavery] is the profit of the master, his security,
and the public safety; the subject, one doomed in his person,
and his posterity, to live without knowledge, and without the
capacity to make anything his own, and to toil that another may
reap the fruits29
36. Until very recent times, this same attitude was taken by state courts in cases
involving prison conditions in the United States. As stated in an early Virginia case:
He [the prisonerl has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his
liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity
accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.
Ruflin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
37. State v. Mann, 2 Dev. 263, 264 (N.C. 1829).
38. See STROUD, supra note 17, at 10; GOODELL, supra note 17, at 174.
39. State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263, 266 (1829).
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The intervention of the criminal law into the daily working rela-
tionship between master and slave could severely hamper the
total economic return sought from slave labor. The truth was,
that courts were forbidden to enter upon a general train of reason-
ing on the subject. They could not allow the right of the master
to be brought into discussion in the courts of justice. The slave,
to remain a slave, must know that there was no appeal from his
master. While slavery existed in its present state it was the im-
perative duty of judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner
over the slave, except where its exercise was forbidden by statute.
This must be the case, "on the ground that this dominion was
essential to the value of slaves as property, to the security of the
master, and the public tranquility, greatly dependent on their
subordination."' The opinion in State v. Mann, along with the
statement of Justice Wardlaw of South Carolina that "every en-
deavor to extend to him [a slave] positive rights is an attempt
to reconcile inherent contradictions [for i]n the very nature of
things, he is subject to despotism,"'" was widely cited as a com-
prehensive and correct statement of the law.4"
This discussion of cases dealing with the personal status of
slaves, demonstrates the important role of the courts in setting
the necessary legal tone for making the institution of slavery a
viable economic reality. By keeping the slave in his personal ca-
pacity on the outskirts of the law, they created a legal milieu
extremely favorable to the continued existence and entrenchment
of slavery. The essential conceptual and methodological battles
were fought and the proper tone set in the personal status cases.
The courts then were free to utilize the known conceptual frame-
work of the common law to adjudicate the great bulk of the cases
coming before them; cases arising out of a plethora of slave-
related business and property disputes. Consequently, while the
interests of the slaveholding community were at stake and the
more important decisions in the private law area involved poten-
tially tremendous amounts of money, the issues in such cases did.
not go to the core of the master-slave relationship itself.4
40. Id. at 269.
41. Ex parte Boylston, 2 Strob. 41, 43 (S.C. 1846).
42. CoBH, supra note 17, at 90.
43. For an account of the social structure of the slave South, from a Marxist point of
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Before proceeding to a discussion of the methodology employed
in cases in the private law dealing with the property aspects of a
slave's status and a detailed analysis of several distinct problem
areas, it will be of value here to examine a decision rendered by
the Supreme Court of Alabama in 1861. Expressing as it does the
results of several decades of judicial inquiry into the personal
status of slaves, it merits attention as a good summary of the law
in this regard. In the short span of 50 years, we see the progression
from the harried analysis of the earliest decisions to the assured,
confident discussion in Creswell's Executor v. Walker.44
In this case the court held that the bequest of a testator giving
his slaves the option of being set free in Liberia or in a free state
was void, due to the legal incapacity of the slave to make such a
choice. In the course of its opinion, the court, speaking through
Justice Walker," made a comprehensive analysis of the general
legal status of bondsmen in the slaveholding states. Numerous
decisions had established that a promise made to a slave for his
own benefit was not enforceable in any legal tribunal. It was
settled that a slave could not sue or be sued, except where he was
clothed with the statutory right of instituting a suit for freedom.
He could not acquire or own property. He had no legal capacity
to make a contract, not even that of marriage. All such decisions
rested upon the fundamental idea that slaves had no civil or
social rights, and were incapable of performing by their own will."
As to the dichotomy in the law between considering slaves as
property for some purposes and persons for others, Judge Walker
had the following explanation.
It was true that slaves were human beings, endowed with intel-
lect, conscience and will. Indeed, their moral and intellectual
view, see E. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY (1967).
It Islaveryl extruded a class of slaveholders with a special ideology and psy-
chology and the political and economic power to impose their values on society
as a whole. Slavery may have been immoral to the world at large, but to these
men, notwithstanding their doubts and inner conflicts, it increasingly came to
be seen as the very foundation of a proper social order and therefore as the
essence of morality in human relationships.
Id. at 8.
44. 37 Ala. 229 (1861).
45. Justice Walker, on occasion, joined Justices Lumpkin and Harris in using the pub-
lished reports to state the public policy of the slaveholding jurisdictions. This practice
expanded in the years just prior to the Civil War.
46. Creswell's Exec. v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229, 234-35 (1861).
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qualities determined to a considerable extent their value. These
qualities were often looked to in ascertaining the rights and liabil-
ities of others in relation to slaves as articles of property. They
were rational human beings; they were regarded as persons in
reference to acts which were crimes. But, because they were
slaves, they were necessarily and "incurably" incapable of per-
forming civil acts. With reference to all such acts they were
things, not persons:
Considered in his relation [to crimes], the theory of a complete
annihilation of will in the slave is wholly unfounded; while in
relation to the former class of acts, it is entirely consistent, and,
indeed, is the only theory that can be consistent with the funda-
mental idea of negro slavery as it exists with us-namely, that
in respect of civil rights and legal capacity to perform acts of a
civil nature, the slave is not a person, but a thing. 7
B. The Slave As Property
A close examination of numerous cases analyzing a slave's sta-
tus as property reveals no rapidly formulated and consistent body
of parallel principles as developed in the area of personal status.
There is, however, a consistent use of the language and concep-
tual framework of traditional common law remedies. The com-
mon law as received or adapted to local conditions could not aid
in the solution of problems regarding the slave's status as a per-
son. It did provide a wealth of integrative technique for adjudicat-
ing disputes revolving around property ownership that was being
utilized successfully in non-slave cases.
The pattern of decision making that emerges indicates that the
interests of the slaveholders, shown by constant judicial notice of
the current custom of the day,"8 was the guiding light to decision.
47. Id. at 236-37.
48. In the act of the legislature . . . extending that system (the common law)
to Carolina, then a province of Great Britain, there is a proviso or exception as
to all of those parts of it, which were inconsistent with the particular constitu-
tions, customs, and laws of this (then) province, which left an opening for this
part of the provincial constitution and custom of tolerating slavery . . . . One
part of this custom or law . . . denied to slaves civil rights ....
White v. Chambers, 2 Bay 70, 74 (S.C. 1796). See also Atwood's Heir's v. Beck, 21 Ala.
590, 608 (1852):
lilt is most unquestionably true, that slaves are now regarded by our law as
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The language and conceptual machinery of the common law
served as the lantern. A massive, continous infusion of custom,
and the social and economic realities of slavery determined the
outcome. Such outcome was, nevertheless, channeled through
and expressed in terms of the common law tradition. In light of
the traditionally slow development of the common law, the estab-
lishment of a relatively complete set of solutions to the unique
private law problems involving slaves, within the short span of
half a century,49 serves as an amazing example of the adaptability
of the common law and the technical resourcefulness of the judges
of the ante-bellum South.
Having analyzed in general terms the efforts of the courts in
attempting to deal with the difficulties raised by the dual status
of a slave, and having indicated the methodology employed in
adjudicating property-related disputes, it remains to give close
attention to some of the more pressing noncriminal issues faced
by the courts and their response to them. Because they cut across
numerous lines and represent the more important areas of adjudi-
cation, 0 the discussion to follow will concentrate on cases involv-
ing three related areas: respondeat superior; the fellow servant
rule and industrial growth; and the power of an equity court to
order the specific delivery of slaves.
III. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
As already intimated, there is perhaps no solution of the great
problem of reconciling the interest of labor and capital, so as to
protect each from the encroachments and oppressions of the
other, so simple and effective as Negro slavery. By making the
chattels, and the owners thereof have an absolute unqualified property in them,
and although such right might not have been recognized by the ancient common
law, yet such is the genius and expansive nature of the common law, that it
adapts itself to the necessities and exigencies of society, and when a new species
of property is introduced, and the statute law is silent as to the rules by which
it is to be governed, the common law embraces it, and its rules are applied to
it, modified, of course, according to the nature of the property thus subjected
to its governance.
49. Thomas Cobb in his second volume had planned to analyze this expanding law for
the practicing bar in the slaveholding jurisdictions. COBB, supra note 17.
50. These areas are considered important because they reflect key areas of economic
and social interaction where a lack of support by courts would have had disastrous conse-
quences for the slave labor system.
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laborer himself capital, the conflict ceases, and the interests be-
come identical-Cobb, Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in
the United States of America ccxiv (1858, reprinted 1968).
In varied private law disputes the courts of the ante-bellum
South were required to utilize the conceptual tools provided by
the received common law to render decisions in slave-related eco-
nomic conflict situations. None were contested more bitterly than
those involving the liability of a master for personal injuries,
deaths, or property damage caused by his slave. Here, as in most
civil cases involving slave property, the received, taught, and
otherwise satisfactory common law tradition provided the tech-
nique and concepts, but rarely a ready answer.5
Several early decisions rejected as inapplicable to slave prop-
erty the principles of respondeat superior as set forth in Black-
stone's Commentaries."2 These principles imposed responsibility
only in instances of injuries arising out of activities specifically
mandated by the master or in cases where the injury was suffered
at the hands of a servant engaged in a public calling, such as
blacksmith, for the master's benefit. However, in the face of in-
creasing demands for imposition of blanket liability on masters
for any injury in fact caused by a slave, the courts soon resorted
to the existing common law. This provided a ready means to
protect slave owners' interests where local civil liability statutes
did not dispose of the matter. 3 Feelings were very strong on both
sides of the issue. However, the realities of life in a slave-oriented
social and economic structure determined the outcome, as it did
in most cases of first impression of any import in the areas of
private law.
One of the earliest cases to discuss the issue in any depth was
51. It is from those two sources, the common law and the civil law, if any
where Isici, that we are to derive the principles by which questions of this sort
are to be governed. But altho' [sic] we can ascertain that slavery actually
existed in both those countries, yet such was the different situations of their
slaves at different periods, that it is not easy to trace the reciprocal duties and
liabilities of master and servant . . . . Even if the task were less difficult, the
condition was so different from that of our slaves that we should profit but little
by the research.
Wingis v. Smith, 3 McCord 400, 402 (S.C. 1825).
52. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *32.
53. See note 72 infra.
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Snee v. Trice,"' decided by the Supreme Court of South Carolina
in 1802. Trice's slaves were in the process of clearing a field leased
from Snee, preparatory to planting a new crop. It being a cold
morning, the slaves lit a fire which, due to a strong wind, ignited
some stubble and eventually Snee's corn crib, destroying bushels
of corn valued at 300 dollars.
Starke, counsel for defendant, urged the court to accept the
common law limitation on a master's liability as the governing
law in regard to the master-slave relationship. The innumerable
potentially injury-producing physical freedoms customarily al-
lowed slaves in the course of their daily activities must remain
free from judicial scrutiny if the institution was to continue. As
to the case at bar, it was well known to every planter that from
time immemorial slaves had been allowed to build fires in the
fields to ward off the morning chill. It would be a cruel master
indeed who would attempt to deprive his slaves of this minor
comfort. In addition to the factor of long-standing custom of
which the instant case was a small example, a deviation from the
common law rule would allow slaves to bring financial ruin upon
their masters by their "studied misconduct.""5
This latter argument sufficiently impressed the trial court and
also struck a responsive chord with the judges of the supreme
court. The slaves volition and physical power to inflict great de-
struction could never be forgotten:
[E]xperience had taught us how little they adhered to advise
[sic] and direction when left alone. It would indeed, under
these circumstances, be a most dangerous thing, to'make their
masters liable in damages for the unauthorized acts of their
slaves, to the extent contended for on behalf of the plaintiff."'
The court admitted the application of respondeat superior in all
cases wherein the slave was allowed to follow a public calling for
the master's benefit or otherwise allowed to attract the public
trust, 7 as well as in all cases where the slave's act was done
54. 2 Bay 345 (S.C. 1802).
55. Id. at 347. Counsel, in the alternative argued pure accident, thereby hoping to
eliminate dispute over the range of a master's liability for a slave's negligence. Id. at 346.
56. Id. at 350.
57. Id. at 348-49. Large numbers of slaves were skilled workers and allowed to deal
directly with the public for the master's benefit, in such capacities as ferrymen, black-
smiths, teamsters, carpenters, and even pharmacists. Id. at 347.
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pursuant to specific direction. However, general liability for neg-
ligent acts even within the scope of service was firmly rejected."5
This basic nonliability approach remained the law on the subject
until the Civil War and the ensuing abolition of slavery.
While this judicial posture in effect left the injured party in
most instances with no recourse, it was still the only socially
responsible rule, given the nature of the institution of slavery. As
noted, again by the South Carolina Supreme Court, 20 years later
in the case of Wingis v. Smith:"
Particular cases of hardship may grow out of the law as thus
settled: But we cannot forsee the extent of the liability which
would spring from a contrary doctrine. The decision [Snee v.
Trice] appears to be founded upon the policy of the country,
and I am disposed to think it correct. It is at least one, on which
it would be dangerous to be trying experiments.'"
Counsel throughout the slaveholding jurisdictions, represent-
ing those who had suffered loss at the hands of another's slave,
nevertheless refused to accept the principle of Snee v. Trice. They
vigorously continued to seek decisions imposing blanket respon-
sibility on the owner of the offending slave. It was in a series of
cases like Wright v. Weatherly,6 decided by the Supreme Court
of Tennessee in 1835, where plaintiff's slave had been murdered
by the slave of defendant, that the social facts were most effu-
sively argued on both sides of the issue.
Weatherly's slave, Jerry, died as a result of stab wounds in-
flicted by Wright's slave, Andrew. Weatherly brought an action
on the case against Wright for 550 dollars. The trial court in-
structed the jury that the master was liable for every trespass
committed by his slave, whether or not the act was done outside
the scope of the master's service, and regardless of his knowledge.
58. In addition, it was argued that the very basis of the principle of respondeat superior
was inapposite to master-slave cases due to the absence of a meaningful action over
against the slave such as was available against free white employees. This point, raised
peripherally here, was used to better advantage in subsequent cases.
The court also noted those "salutory checks" of physical chastisement of the slave by
the master which were considered a more efficient means of preventing delicts by slaves
than an award of money damages.
59. 3 McCord 400 (S.C. 1825).
60. Id. at 405.
61. 15 Tenn. 366 (1835).
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The jury found for the plaintiff.
Attorney Ready, arguing for the defendant, again stressed the
nonliability of a master under English law for the wanton acts of
his servant. 2 As to the Roman law wherein the master was liable
for all trespasses of his slave, Ready argued the injustice of its
application since, due to statutes prohibiting excessive mistreat-
ment of slaves, 3 masters in the United States lacked the corre-
sponding total power over their bondsman. Even if such a princi-
ple was applicable to the case, the judgment below was still in
error since the Roman law made the master liable only up to the
value of his offending slave, and by delivering up the offending
slave all further liability was ended. 4
W. E. Anderson, counsel for Wright, after a brief discussion of
the common and Roman law principles applicable to the case,
launched into a spirited analysis of the realities of life in a slave-
holding jurisdiction and the moral weakness of the argument that
liability would ring the death knell of the institution. It could be
argued that the adoption of this principle might prove ruinous to
owners, since a slave had the physical ability to inflict harm
which would, in amount, far exceed his whole value to his master.
However, the owning of such property was voluntary on the part
of the master; the owner exercised just such care as pleased him-
self in examining the moral character and qualities of the slave
when purchased, and in developing the character of the slave he
raised through teaching and discipline. Far better that he should
run the risk of ruin than his neighbor who had no say in the
matter or any control over the slave. 5
62. Id. at 368. Counsel, in every case in the area of the private law where statute did
not govern, urged the applicability or non-applicability of the received common law,
depending upon which side of the issue they were arguing.
63. Id. Each slaveholding jurisdiction, as part of their Black Codes, had statutory
measures setting out the limits of master's use of corporal punishment and setting mini-
mum requirements as to food and clothing. These statutes, if a reading of reported deci-
sions is indicative, appear rarely to have been enforced.
64. Id. at 369. Due to the continual fluctuation in slave prices during the ante-bellum
years, such a limitation would often work to the defendant master's advantage in cases of
serious injury.
The "actio noxalis" limitation of the civil law was raised by defense counsel in virtually
every case of this nature in an attempt to set some ceiling on his client's loss in the event
of an unfavorable ruling.
65. Id. at 369-75.
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Due to the increase in the number of slaves and the continued
growth of the nonslaveholding sector of the community, continu-
ing a rule of nonliability would lead to greater social friction than
already existed between the two segments of the population. The
court was reminded that the great majority of the citizens of the
state were nonslaveholders, in the proportion of five to ten non-
slaveholders for each slaveholder66
A. J. Hoover, co-counsel, continuing the attack, also reminded
the court of the preferred position of slaveholders before the law
and the social ramifications of the slave labor system on the less
affluent members of the community. That the owner of slaves
should in such cases answer in damages was demanded by every
principle of justice, for the laws of the state protected him in that
ownership. He had a remedy, both civil and criminal, against any
individual who injured his interest by punishing his slaves. He
was enriched with the profits of their labor, and he alone pos-
sessed the chief power of preventing, them from the commission
of wrongs. Additionally, there was a portion of the citizenry whose
principles would not allow them to own slaves, and another very
large portion financially unable to own them. Many would be
kept out of employment in consequence of the existence of
slavery. If it were determined that there should be no redress for
the immediate and direct injuries committed by slaves, the law
would become the slave of the slaveholder. 7 As to defense argu-
ments that a court in such serious matters should await legisla-
tive action, Hoover made the following terse reply:
The objection, that the legislature should first act upon the
subject, comes with a bad grace from the owner of slaves. For
whenever they have had any rights, growing out of the existence
of slavery, the courts have protected them, without any legisla-
tive enactments upon the subject."
66. Id. at 373.
67. Id. at 375-78. While there are a smaller number of slaves in Tennessee than other
slaveholding states, the points raised by Hoover were valid for those other jurisdictions
as well. As noted by Kenneth Stampp:
In 1860, there were in the South 385,000 owners of slaves distributed among
1,516,000 free families. Nearly three-fourths of all free Southerners had no
connection with slavery through either family ties or direct ownership. The
"typical" Southerner was not only a small farmer but also a nonslaveholder.
K. STAMPP, supra note 13, at 30.
68. Wright v. Weatherly, 15 Tenn. 366, 371-72 (1835).
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In the face of these arguments, the court, speaking through
Judge Green, reluctantly, but nevertheless decisively, continued
the rule of nonliability. The concepts provided by the common
law, respondeat superior or the responsibility of the owner of
domestic animals, would not support the action. The domestic
animal analogy failed for the obvious reason that the subject of
scrutiny was a thinking, willing human being. Under the tradi-
tional principles of respondeat superior, the master here would
clearly not be responsible. While Judge Green felt constrained by
the limits of his power as a judge in such a vital area, his personal
view was somewhat different:
[lit is manifest that some remedy, in a case like the present,
is loudly called for, by which to protect the people from injuries
which this unfortunate, degraded and vicious class of our popu-
lation, may inflict. The court, however, cannot afford such rem-
edy. Its business is to expound the law as it exists, and apply
established principles to cases as they may arise."
While the law gave the master the entire property of the slave, it
was only just that he should answer, at least to some extent, for
the injuries his slave might do to others. Such a provision would
not only be fair and equal among the slaveholders themselves, but
in relation to the majority of the people of the state who did not
own slaves it was "imperiously required."' "
In states such as Missouri, where a relevant statutory measure
based on Roman law was on the books, liability was strictly lim-
ited to its terms. In Jennings v. Kavanaugh," decided by the
Missouri court in 1837, the facts were basically those in
Weatherly: the murder of plaintiff's slave by a slave owned by
defendant. A statute" provided for recovery from the master in
69. Id. at 380.
70. Id.
71. 5 Mo. 26 (1837).
72. Every person who shall be injured by the commission of any offence
against his person, as specified in the second article, or against his property, as
specified in the third article of this act, committed by a slave, shall have an
action against the master or owner of such slave for the time, to recover any
damages by him sustained by the commission of such offence, not exceeding in




an amount not exceeding the value of the offending slave 7: in
certain cases of offenses by slaves against the person or property
of another. The murder of a slave was not one of the designated
property injuries, but counsel for Jennings argued that the stat-
ute indicated a legislative intent to allow recovery in any instance
of property loss, especially one as at bar, where the hardship
would be greater than the specified instances. Judge Tompkins
rejected such reasoning, indicating the exception made by the
statute to the principle of nonliability in such cases as the one at
issue. There was no obscurity in the act and courts were limited
expressly to giving recovery only for the offenses against property
specified in the third article. 4
Even in hard cases such as Leggett v. Simmons" the court
refused to budge on the issue of liability for intentional acts. In
this 1846 Mississippi case, defendant on several occasions in one
evening broke up a vicious altercation between his slave and
plaintiff's, and had been threatened by plaintiff's slave with his
own weapon. Plaintiff's slave was later slain. Indicating the influ-
ence of the old adage that hard cases make bad law, Justice
Thatcher stated:
The defendant was doubtless censurable and blamable, for want
of care, prudence, and resolute and sufficient interference be-
tween the slaves at the outset of the fatal difficulty, but his
conduct seems hardly to warrant the finding of the jury, as such
cases are contemplated by the law."
As in most cases in which the courts supported the interests of
the owners of slaves, the issue refused to die. However, the estab-
lished principle held fast even in matters much less serious than
the murder of another's slave, as when an unauthorized inten-
tional trespass was committed by a slave. In an attempt to halt
the continuing debate, Chief Justice Ruffin of North Carolina
73. Several jurisdictions did have this type of legislation which echoed the "actio nox-
alis" limitation of the civil law, as was suggested by Judge Green in Wright v. Weatherly,
15 Tenn. 366, 371-72 (1835). See generally CoB, supra note 17, for materials dealing with
such legislation.
74. Jennings v. Kevanaugh, 5 Mo. 26, 27 (1837).
75. 14 Miss. (7 S. & M.) 348 (1846).
76. 30 N.C. 446 (1848).
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analyzed the dual aspects of social realities and the nature of the
English restriction in the case of Parham v. Blackwelder.77
Blackwelder's slave, without her consent, went upon the land
of plaintiff and hauled away wood valued at 50 cents. In this
obvious back fence dispute, the trial court instructed the jury
that even though defendant would not be liable if the wood were
taken by a free white laborer, she must answer for the act of her
slave. Justice Ruffin fully realized the importance of the issue,
but expressed dismay at the continuing efforts of litigant's coun-
sel:
The question in this case is of much consequence in this country,
and, particularly, to the owners of slaves. Though formerly dis-
cussed to some extent, we had supposed it to have been long at
rest in the minds of the profession, and that in a way, opposite
to the opinion given to the jury on this trial."
The argument that the rule must be adjusted in cases of innocent
injury suffered at the hands of a slave found no support in any
decided opinion." In fact, noted Ruffin, this lack of support fur-
nished a strong argument against the action. Slavery prevailed
extensively in the country, and there could be no doubt that
many recoveries would have been sought and awarded if the law
were as urged by the plaintiff. Moreover, argued Ruffin, such
distinction is not supported by principle, regardless of precedent.
The entire argument rests on the assumed necessity of some indi-
vidual being responsible for the innocently suffered loss in order
to act as a deterrent or to provide recompense.
The deterrent argument failed, Ruffin noted, because the slave
was responsible criminally if the trespassory act amounted to a
public offense. Moreover, he continued, echoing considerations
briefly stated in Snee v. Trice:"
IFlor the very reason, that slaves are not liable for damages,
our law renders them summarily punishable corporally in many
instances, in which free persons are not indictable. In restraint
77. Id. at 446-47.
78. Id.
79. The absence of precedent was often raised by court and counsel seeking to avoid
the development of parallel concepts for the resolution of slave-related litigation.
80. 2 Bay 345 (S.C. 1802).
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of wrongs by slaves, therefore, there is that most powerful con-
sideration of responsibility personally, even to a greater degree
than in the instance of free persons, in respect, at least, of minor
offences, and in equal degree in respect to all others; and that
is, surely the most effectual protection both of the public and
individuals from injury.81
Judge Ruffin answered the argument that it was necessary for
a financially responsible person to compensate the victims be-
cause of the civil irresponsibility of the offending slave. The judge
relied upon what was to him the obvious purpose of the English
restrictions on liability in cases of like trespasses committed by
free servants. The determinant was not the asserted differences
between the free servant and slave in their ability to pay for
damage, but rather the factor of personal fault:
[1lt seems very manifest that the difference in that respect ...
ought not to have the effect attributed to it. For, in general, the
pecuniary responsibility of menials, though so by contract, is
but nominal, and, in cases of aggravated injuries, it is altogether
inadequate. The rule at common law could not have been
founded on such a responsibility; for it would most commonly
be merely illusory.2
The true reason was that for the willful, wanton acts of a serv-
ant, whether or not engaged in his master's business, an equally
innocent party, the employer, should not be responsible. That
same reasoning applied with equal force to slaves. Hence, the true
criterion was whether the master was or was not the cause of the
trespass by expressly ordering it or subsequently sanctioning it,
not whether the person injured can or cannot have an action
against the slave. It was a misfortune if one injured in his person
or property by another could not obtain adequate pecuniary sat-
isfaction. The misfortune was no greater when the wrongdoer was
a slave than when he was anyone else who had no property. That
the injured party was unable in either case to secure redress
against the perpetrator of the wrong affords no reason why he
should recover from one who was as innocent as himself.8 3
81. Parham v. Blackwelder, 30 N.C. 446, 448 (1848).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 450.
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This controversy retained its vitality up to the eve of the Civil
War. Counsel continued their persistent efforts to change the law,
having in such fashion achieved a turn-about in other important
private law areas. 4 In the last case to be considered, McConnell
v. Hardeman," decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in
1854, the court drew upon all of the arguments on either side of
the issue. They examined the existing case law, recognized the
increasing amount of social friction involving injuries of this na-
ture, but again, albeit reluctantly, held fast.
The plaintiff sued the defendant in trespass for the tortious act
of his slave in taking the plaintiff's horse. Chief Justice Watkins
indicated that the simple justice of the situation appeared to call
for a remedy, but resignedly noted that the decided cases took a
different stance:
[O]n first impression ...it would seem that the master ought
to be liable to make reparation in damages to the person injured
by the trespass of his slave. It was so according to the civil law,
to which the institution of slavery, as it exists in some of the
American states, is very nearly assimilated. And yet, with the
exception of Louisiana, such has not been the course of decisions
in this country."
Justice Watkins criticized the "extreme ground" taken by the
court in Snee v. Trice"7 and other decisions, but concluded that
the analysis of Justice Ruffin in Parham v. Blackwelder" was at
least closest to the mark from an analytical standpoint. As to the
whole line of cases, continued Watkins, while they were unsatis-
factory "it would be unsafe to depart from them." 9
The basic problem, Justice Watkins realized, was one of
methodology. Daily legal life operated, and disputes were adjudi-
84. The power of an equity court to issue decrees for the specific delivery of slave
property is a prime example.
85. 15 Ark. 151 (1854).
86. Id. at 153.
87. It may be that the earlier decisions on this subject, where the common
law system of pleading had been adopted, were influenced more by the form
than the substance of the remedy, following a rule of law founded on reasons
which have but little application to cases of this description.
McConnell v. Hardeman, 15 Ark. 151, 158 (1854).
88. Parham v. Blackwelder, 30 N.C. 446 (1848).
89. 15 Ark. at 158.
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cated, within the context of the received, taught common law
tradition and that law provided-other than a known tech-
nique-little assistance in the policy ridden slave-related cases.
Here, in McConnell, a Roman law-based statute provided the
only opportunity for recovery against the slaveholder:
The common law doctrine relating to master and servant,
though . . . inapplicable, having been adopted, any, extension
of the master's liability is the creature of the statute. 0 (empha-
sis added)
It would be for the legislature to consider whether the true inter-
ests of slaveholders would be promoted by making them liable for
all trespasses committed by their slaves. This would remove
many causes of jealousy and ill-feeling against the owners of that
species of property, and at the same time protect them by limit-
ing their liability, as in the Roman law, to the value of the offend-
ing slaves."
By strictly applying to the master-slave relationship the exist-
ing common law restrictions on a master's liability for the injury-
producing acts of his servants, the courts avoided the creation of
a parallel conceptual structure and effectively protected the in-
terests of slaveowners. This position was deemed necessary, if not
just, in cases of neighbor against neighbor. It reflected an aware-
ness of the pattern of social interaction inherent in any slave labor
system. The gradual growth of a major business in the leasing of
slaves to commercial businesses, however, resulting in scores of
disabling injuries and deaths far from home, caused the integra-
tion process to fall on hard times.
Judicially forcing neighbors to resign themselves to the existing
order of social reality was one thing. Balancing the interests of
masters and the rapidly developing industrial and transportation
sectors of the economy was quite another. This was especially so
in light of the increasing threat to the South from the Northern
states, who were in the midst of a rapid economic metamorphosis.





IV. THE FELLOW SERVANT RULE
So long as climate and disease, and the profitable planting of
cotton, rice, tobacco, and cane make the Negro the only laborer
inhabiting safely our Southern savannas and prairies, just so
long will he remain a slave to the white man. Whenever the
white laborer can successfully compete with him in these pro-
ductions and occupy this soil, the Negro will either be driven
slowly through the isthmus, to become amalgamated with the
races of South America, or he will fall a victim to disease and
neglect, begging bread at the white man's door.-T. Cobb,
Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of
America ccxxi (1858, reprinted 1968).
Chief Justice Shaw, in 1842, delivered his famous opinion in
Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R.,92 delineating the fellow-
servant doctrine. The rule established a liability buffer for an
employer by providing that injuries suffered by an employee due
to the fault of a co-worker were only compensable in an action of
tort against the fellow servant. Four years later, the important
question of whether this exception to the doctrine of respondeat
superior applied to slave labor came up for resolution in the court
of Justice Joseph H. Lumpkin of Georgia. The issue was a vital
one for slave owners. Aside from their use on the owner's farm or
plantation, a very considerable business existed in the hiring out
of slave labor on long or short term arrangements to railroads,
steamship lines, bridge building companies, mines, and factories.
Slaves were not only utilized in constructing roadbeds and laying
rails, but were actively engaged as railroad firemen, ship's hands,
and other nonmenial occupations throughout the South. 3 Justice
Lumpkin allayed the fears of slave owners by unqualifiedly de-
claring that the fellow servant rule had no application to slave
labor, thus allowing actions in tort by the lessor-master against
the lessee.
The decision, Scudder v. WoodbirJe," decided in 1846, re-
92. 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). The principle actually gained its original support in
an earlier South Carolina decision, Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 1 S.C. 385 (1841), but
Shaw's ruling in Farwell v. Boston & Worchester R.R. was the impetus for the eventual
adoption of the rule throughout the country.
93. See, e.g., K. STAMPP, supra note 13, at 71-73, and cases discussed infra.
94. 1 Ga. 195 (1846).
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volved around an action on the case brought by WoodbirJe, the
owner of Ned, a slave carpenter, against Scudder, the owner of
the river boat Ivanhoe. Ned had been hired out to Scudder for a
trip from Savannah to St. Marys and during the course of the trip
was killed after becoming entangled in the water wheel. It was
established that the death had been caused by the negligence of
Scudder's officers 5 on deck, and the jury found for the plaintiff.
Justice Lumpkin noted that the question was new in the state
and it deserved "the gravest consideration." He acknowledged
the correctness of the opinion of Shaw and others9 and stated
that the fellow servant doctrine would be applied in the state of
Georgia. However, he continued, "interest to the owner, and
humanity to the slave, forbid its application to any other than
free white agents."97
The very rationale of the rule could have no application to slave
laborers. They dare not interfere with the business of others for
they would be instantly chastised for their impertinence. Nor
could they testify as to anyone's misconduct. They could not
exercise the discretion, left to free white agents, of quitting their
employment when matters were mismanaged or portended harm.
Whether engaged as carpenters, bricklayers, blacksmiths, ferry-
men, wagoners, patroons or private hands, in boats or vessels in
the coasting navigations, on railroads, or any other avocation,
they had no choice but to serve silently out their appointed time
while submitting to whatever risks and dangers were incident to
the employment. "Bound to fidelity themselves, they do not, and
cannot act as securities, either for the care or competency of
others.""
After demonstrating that the nature of slavery eliminated the
application of the doctrine to slaves since the rule could apply
only to one with the freedom to choose his work, Justice Lumpkin
turned his attention to an equally compelling reason for the non-
applicability of the rule, the economic interest of the master:
95. In light of the eventual holding, it is of interest to note that the fellow servants in
this case, the officers, probably were financially responsible.
96. Murray v. South Carolina R.R., 1 S.C. 385 (1841).
97. Scudder v. WoodbirJe, 1 Ga. 195, 198-99 (1846).
98. Id. at 199.
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[W]hat can the master know of the condition of the vessel,
road, work or machinery, where his servant is employed, or of
the skill or prudence of the persons associated with him? [A]
large portion of the employees of the South are either slaves or
free persons of color, wholly irresponsible, civiliter, for their neg-
lect or malfeasance. The engineer on the Ivanhoe was a colored
man. Had the accident been attributed to his mismanagement,
to whom should WoodbirJe have looked for redress? [Wie
think it needless to multiply reasons on a point so palpable.',
Judge Lumpkin's final point was that humanity to the slave
required an exclusion of the doctrine. This point may have been
discussed to quiet the outrage of Northern abolitionists, such as
Judge Stroud and Reverend Goodell, who eagerly awaited the
publication of the Southern reports with which to load their rhe-
torical canons. That most Southern judges believed in the system
of slavery and daily supported it in their decision making cannot,
however, hide the fact that humanitarian concerns often entered
into their reasoning on the issues brought to them for resolution.
In this vein, Judge Lumpkin noted that in almost every occupa-
tion requiring combined effort, the employer necessarily en-
trusted responsibility to a variety of agents. Many of those were
"destitute of principle, and bankrupt in fortune." If it were judi-
cially pronounced that the owner of slaves hired to the numerous
navigation, railroad, mining, and manufacturing companies
which dotted the countryside could look for compensation only to
the co-servant who caused the harm, no hired slave's life would
be safe. As it was, "the guards thrown around this class of the
population were sufficiently few and feeble."'' 0
In Forsyth and Simpson v. Perry,'1' decided by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1853, White v. Smith,'"' decided by the South
Carolina high court in 1860, and Howes v. The Steamer Red
Chief, "'I rendered by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the same
year, the rulings were couched in more traditional language. Nev-
ertheless, the underlying social realities expressed by Judge
99. Id.
100. Id. at 199-200.
101. 5 Fla. 337 (1853).
102. 12 S.C. 595 (1960).
103. 15 La. Ann. 321 (1860).
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Lumpkin were their foundation. As noted by Judge Semmes in
the Perry case, the fellow servant rule exception applied to
persons competent to contract, responsible for the consequences
of their own conduct, and entitled to the same rights and reme-
dies as their co-agents. How could slaves be included within the
rule when it was manifest that they had none of those rights or
remedies against others and were not liable in a civil suit for their
own acts or misconduct?"'4
In addition, argued Judge Semmes, the interest of both slave
and master militated against any contrary doctrine. The judge
took judicial notice of the increasing amount of personal injury
resulting from the low level of competency among those employed
in the river traffic.
The liability of the employer, civiliter, for the misconduct of his
subordinates, will naturally add to the personal security and
protection of the slave. Public policy emphatically demands,
that the owners of boats, railroads, and other public convey-
ances, should employ careful and capable agents in their respec-
tive business."' 5
This factor of increasing injury, as well as the obvious bitter-
ness felt toward hired slaves by free, white, but impoverished co-
workers, was stressed by Judge Duffel in The Steamer Red Chief:
The usual carelessness of steamboatmen, and, unfortunately,
the too little value which is often set on human life should not
be a means of defense, but rather a forcible reason, in the inter-
est of the community at large, not to enlarge the exception to
the general rule which fixed the liability of the master for the
acts of his agent.""'
In North Carolina, however, in a case almost identical to the
fact situation of the leading case of Farwell v. Boston. & Worcester
R. R."'7 decided by Shaw, Judge Ruffin rejected the argument of
counsel that the fellow servant rule was inapplicable to slave
laborers. The 1858 case, Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R.,"'
104. 5 Fla. 337, 344 (1853).
105. Id. at 344-45.
106. 15 La. Ann. 321, 324 (1960).
107. 4 Mass. (Met.) 49 (1842).
108. 51 N.C. (6 Jones Law) 245 (1850).
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grew out of the death of plaintiff's slave resulting from his being
crushed by a train improperly switched onto the wrong track.
Ponton was unsuccessful in the trial court and brought an appeal
to the supreme court.
Judge Ruffin began his opinion by noting that the rule was of
recent origin and that it owed its existence to the great number
of servants employed and needed by railroads and steamboat
companies. After discussing the English decision of Priestly v.
Fowler,"" which created the fellow servant concept, and reviewing
the American decisions dealing with the issue, Judge Ruffin
countered the argument of the plaintiffi"' that a basic distinction
must be made when slave labor is under consideration. The dis-
tinction might be sound if the slave were the person to be bene-
fited by the recovery. But the action was by the owner, for his
benefit, and it was obvious that it was in his power also, by
stipulations in the contract, to provide for the responsibility of
the bailee for exposing the slave to extraordinary risks, or for his
liability to the owner for all losses arising from any cause. It was
sufficient protection to his property, as owner, to be put on the
same footing with the protection of a freeman.'"
Aside from Judge Ruffins' lone attempt to avoid the creation
of parallel concepts for slqve property, the courts held fast. Here,
the interest of the master necessitated parallel rules. This was not
an isolated area, however. As the tempo of an economy desper-
ately trying to free itself from an agrarian base increased, the
struggle to integrate slave property into the overall private law
system under construction heightened. As a consequence, the in-
tegration process suffered.
Two related topics, the liability of carriers for injury to or loss
of a slave in cases of authorized or unauthorized transit, must be
examined. They further illustrate the difficulties encountered by
the courts in attempting to balance the interests of the slaveown-
ers with those of the nascent industrial and transportation sectors
of the economy.
109. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1937).
110. Indeed, the counsel for the plaintiff admitted that the rule was so thor-
oughly settled that it could not be shaken unless upon the distinction that the
injury complained of in this case was to the person of a slave.
Ponton v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 51 N.C. (6 Jones Law) 245 (1850).
111. Id.
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V. BAILMENTS AND CARRIER LIABILITY
[a]nd notwithstanding, a distinguished statesman at the
North has predicted that in case of war, the South would be-
come the Flanders of America, the history of the last two wars,
and of the last seventy years, commencing with Lord Dunmore's
fruitless attempt to stir up a servile insurrection in Virginia,
falsifies this opinion. No subordinate class in the world enter-
tains the same strength of attachment toward their superiors.
And this feeling is to a great extent reciprocated. The very
strength and security of the South consists in the loyalty of our
Negro population to their owners. . . .- Lumpkin, C. J.,
Dudley v. Mallery, 4 Ga. 52, 65-66 (1848).
By uniform and universal usage [slaves] are constituted the
agents of their owners, and are sent on their business without
written authority. And in like manner, they are sent to perform
those neighborly offices [husking], common in every com-
munity. They are not at all times, in the service of their owners,
and are allowed, by universal sufferance at night, on Sundays
and holidays and other occasions to go abroad, to attend church
. . . and to exercise other enjoyments without it ever entering
the mind of any good citizen to demand written authority of
them. The simple truth is, such indulgences have been so long,
and so uniformly tolerated that the public sentiment upon the
subject has acquired almost the force of positive law.-
McKinny, J., Allen v. Jones, 1 Head (Tenn.) 626, 636-37
(1858).
Railroads and steamships were used by owners and bailees to
transport slave labor from one locale to another. In addition, a
substantial amount of slave labor was let out to work in these
facilities. Therefore, rules had to be formulated to deal with the
two greatest threats to a master's interest in slave property: loss
of the slave through injury or death and the ever present danger
of escape.
The nonapplicability of the fellow servant rule to slave labor,
whether viewed as the result of economic necessity or the inherent
logic of the rule itself, protected the owners from loss in work-
related injuries. However, the problem remained of a carrier's
general liability for injury to or loss of a slave during passage in
two instances: (1) the authorized transit of a slave, either alone
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or in the company of his master or bailee, and (2) the unauthor-
ized transit of an unaccompanied slave.
A. Authorized Transit
In the 1829 case of Boyce v. Anderson,112 Chief Justice John
Marshall settled the law relating to death or injury during
authorized transit. He resurrected the ancient common law prin-
ciples as to the liability of a carrier of goods which required a
showing of fault, and applied them to the carriage of slave prop-
erty. Boyce's agent and a group of his slaves were going downriver
on the Mississippi in the steamer Teche when it caught fire and
exploded. The agent, slaves and other passengers made it to
shore. They were spotted by the steamer Washington which sent
out a yawl to bring them aboard without charge and transport
them to the nearest port. During the process, the boat's paddle
wheel was prematurely started, resulting in the yawl being upset
and a slave being drowned. Boyce filed suit against the owners of
the Washington, alleging that their liability for the carriage of his
slave property was absolute.
Marshall noted that there was no special contract of carriage
between the parties. His main concern was the circuit court's
charge that the current strict liability doctrine of a carrier's liabil-
ity for bailed goods had no application to slave property. He
posed the question as to whether a sound distinction could be
made between a human being, in whose person another had an
interest, and nonhuman property. A slave had volition and feel-
ings which could not be overlooked in conveying him from place
to place. He could not be stowed away as a common package.
This was not only forbidden by principles of humanity, but might
endanger his life or health and hence, his value. Consequently,
strict liability in such cases would not apply unless stipulated to
by special contract. Being left at liberty, the slave might escape.
The fact remained that the carrier did not and could not have the
same absolute control over the slave that he had over inanimate
objects. In nature and character, the slave resembled a passenger,
not a package of goods. Thus, the only reasonable principle was
112. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 150 (1829).
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that the responsibility of the carrier should be measured by the
law applicable to passengers, not by the law applicable to bailed
goods.' 3
In the course of Marshall's inevitable search for a methodology,
he noted that while there were no slaves in England, there were
persons in whose service another had a temporary interest. The
law of carriers relating to goods had never been applied to their
transit. On the contrary, the applicable standard was negligence.
Quoting from Sir William Jones' Treatise on Bailments,"4 Mar-
shall argued that the early English law provided that carriers for
hire were only liable for neglect. While that rule was altered to
one of strict liability as commerce advanced, it was still viable
during the ante-bellum period and applicable to slave property."I5
The Anderson case possibly was a poor fact setting in which
to formulate a rule of law governing a carrier's general liability
for the transit of slaves, because the undertaking was a gratuitous
courtesy on the part of the Washington. Nevertheless, the case
was cited up to the Civil War as stating the correct -principle of
law on the subject.'"' For example, in Mitchell v. Western &
Atlantic R.R.,"17 decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in
1860, plaintiff, his wife, children and ten slaves took passage at
Atlanta for Kingston. The slaves were paid for as passengers. The
train stopped for wood and water and one of the slaves, a boy aged
ten, was run over when the train resumed its journey. Judge
Lyon, echoing the rationale of Chief Justice Marshall, stated:
The slave has volition, the right of locomotion, and the defen-
dant has no right to restrain him in the exercise thereof, by the
use of chains or other violent means, unless there has been an
express stipulation between the parties to do so."'
113. Id. at 154.
114. This was a very popular and oft-cited treatise in the era under discussion in both
slave and non-slave cases.
115. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 150, 156 (1829).
116. IClonsidering slaves as property, it is certainly an exception to the
general law of liability, in relation to common carriers. But it is an exception
produced by reason of necessity, from the nature of the property.
Scruggs v. Davis, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 664, 666 (1859).
117. 30 Ga. 22 (1860).
118. Id. at 26. While the Anderson case maintained its authority, at times great pains
were taken to limit it to its fact setting-a gratuitous undertaking with the owner or his




The reasoning and authority of Chief Justice Marshall, and the
necessity of balancing the interests of both the slaveowners and
the carriers, overcame any desire on the part of courts to give
greater protection to slaveholders in cases of authorized transit.
This was not the case, however, where the slave was injured or
lost to the master as a result of unauthorized carriage. In such
situations, the courts of the ante-bellum South brought the full
force of public policy to bear, mirroring once again the realities
of life in a social and economic milieu revolving around the insti-
tution of slavery.
The law regulating carrier liability in cases of loss or injury to
slaves during authorized transit was based on the earliest com-
mon law principles of bailment. The law dealing with
unauthorized conveyances was based, at least formally in the
later years, on the violation of statute. In the absence of statute,
and even in cases where legislation was available, the courts uti-
lized current common law principles of conversion to reach the
same results. Most of the slave states had enacted statutes pro-
viding for monetary fines for any unauthorized passage. Compen-
sation was also provided for all expenses due to financial outlays
incurred in recovering fugitive slaves utilizing the defendant's
line to escape, including full payment of the value of a slave
permanently lost to the owner." 9 The carrier's liability in this
area, whether based on statute or case law, revolved around the
after distinguishing Anderson on the basis that the condition of the boat was not at issue,
held strictly liable the owner of a ferry boat which had slipped its mooring as plaintiffs
slave and mule began to enter, resulting in the slave's death by drowning:
[Wihere the loss has been occasioned by the apparent negligence of the party
in providing sale and sufficient means to perform what has been undertaken to
the public, he comes within the rules applicable to common carriers, whatever
may be the kind of property lost by the default.
Id. at 802.
119. The statute utilized in Mangham v. Cox & Waring, 29 Ala. 81 (1856) is typical:
Any railroad company, in whose car or vehicle, and the master or owner of any
steamboat or vessel, in which a slave is transported or carried, without the
written authority of the owner or person in charge of such slave, forfeits to the
owner the sum of fifty dollars; and, if such slave is lost, is liable for his value,




presence or absence of a sufficiently detailed pass or permit au-
thorizing the travel.
Justice Nesbit of the Supreme Court of Georgia gave one of the
best definitions of the nature and function of the general pass in
the case of Macon & Western R.R. v. Holt,2 " decided in 1850. In
Holt, plaintiffs slave, while free on a pass, boarded defendant's
train to avoid an eight mile walk to his destination. During the
course of the trip he fell off of the train, resulting in the eventual
amputation of his leg. At that time, the state of Georgia had no
statute dealing with such cases. The owner averred that at no
time did he give his slave permission to board a train to go any-
where.
Prior to an analysis of the carrier's liability, Justice Nesbit
addressed the legal perimeters of the pass and its vital import-
ance to the institution of slavery. The pass established the mas-
ter's consent that the slave could leave his home for a specified
time. This included the privilege of enjoying that time in such
manner as he chose to occupy it. It also established, however, the
limitation that the slave should visit only the place or places
specified. It proved nothing more and it was the legal duty of the
owner not to permit his slave to leave his plantation without a
ticket. It was the right of the slave when leaving his master's
protection, with his consent, to have the protection which the
permit afforded against punishment. The permit originated in
the necessity for a vigilant police, and its primary object was
protection against the penalties of the patrol laws. Such, and no
more, were the offices of a general pass.'2 '
Justice Nesbit held that the slave's general pass was insuffi-
cient evidence of the plaintiff's permission for the ride. After a
lengthy discussion of the law of bailments, he ruled that defen-
dant's act of taking the slave on board was a conversion and its
liability absolute, even though no fault on the railroad's part was
alleged or established by Holt. The justice was careful to note
that the Anderson case was not applicable since there the owner,
through his agent, had consented to the transit and no fee was
120. 8 Ga. 157 (1850).
121. Id. at 159. See also CoBB, supra note 17, at 109.
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charged.'2 He had the following terse comment on the apparent
severity of his ruling:
[T]he increased risk, growing out of the reasoning, willing pow-
ers, of a living human creature, does not affect the principle.
Cognizant of these properties in the chattel, they take the risk.
For the purposes, however, of this argument, and, indeed, upon
all the legal principles involved, we can consider the slave in no
other light than as a bale of goods. I repeat, that the absence of
any intention to do a wrong to the owner, does not change the
legal character of the act-it is a conversion without that.,"
The absence of consent provided the courts with a means of
imposing greater liability upon carriers in cases of injury or death.
The major concern of the courts and legislatures in imposing such
sanctions was the possibility of the escape of slaves. The best
judicial analysis of the multiple factors surrounding this issue was
made by Chief Justice Rice of the Supreme Court of Alabama in
the 1856 case of Mangham v. Cox & Waring.' 4
In the Cox & Waring case, the plaintiff's runaway slave had
secreted himself on board the defendant's steamboat and was not
discovered until the boat was 75 miles upriver from its debarka-
tion point in Mobile. Upon discovering him, the captain put him
in chains and eventually deposited him in the Montgomery jail,
where he died of pneumonia. Justice Rice recognized the plight
of a defendant in such a situation, but nevertheless, reluctantly
declared the state policy:
However inconvenient or difficult it may be for the master of a
steamboat to prevent any slave from being carried or trans-
ported on it, without the written authority of his owner... ,
yet it is not impossible for him to do it. The legislature has made
it his duty to do it and declared the consequences of his failure.
The legislature has scrupulously exacted such written authority.
The law is plainly one of public policy, which we are bound to
enforce and maintain, whatever may be our opinion of its wis-
122. IWlere such a case before me, I would unhesitatingly decide in accord-
ance with the rule held by the Supreme Court. It is very apparent, however, that
this case is distinguishable.
Macon & W. R.R. v. Holt, 8 Ga. 157 (1850).
123. Id. at 167.
124. 29 Ala. 81 (1856).
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dom or justice, and however severe may be its operation in par-
ticular cases.'25
The political realities of the day and the innumerable oppor-
tunities for escape militated against any compromise. The im-
mense value of slave property; the "peculiar nature" of slaves;
the known disposition of the abolitionists of the nonslaveholding
states to "delude them [slaves] by art and persuasion" to avail
themselves of all facilities for escaping from their owners; the
extent of the water boundaries of the state; the number of steam-
boats and vessels navigating the waters and rivers within its lim-
its; the vehicles running upon railroads in the state; the celerity
of the movements of these boats, vessels and vehicles; and the
consequent exposure of the owners of slaves, to the "depredations
of the fanatical and vicious," collectively considered, necessitated
the legislation. 2"
It was not in escape or injury cases alone that a master was
protected by the imposition of blanket responsibility on the
errant carrier. In the case of Western and Atlantic R.R. v.
Fulton,"7 decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1857, a
slave in the service of the Atlantic R.R. Co. had a pass allowing
him to make a trip to Chattanooga, Tennessee and back. He gave
the pass to his brother, the slave of Fulton. It was accepted by
the conductor, and Fulton's slave was transported to Atlanta,
Georgia. Upon arrival, he was seized and sold to satisfy a judg-
ment against the person from whom Fulton had bought him,
pursuant to a void lien on the slave. Fulton received a judgment
against the railroad for 900 dollars in the trial court.
125. Id. at 89.
126. Id. at 88-89. Judge Lumpkin of Georgia, in language characteristically more flam-
boyant, but equally to the point, had declared a year earlier:
The South has lost, already, upwards of 60,000 slaves worth between 25 and 30
millions of dollars. Instead . . . of relaxing the means allowed by law for the
security and enjoyment of this species of property, the facilities afforded for its
escape and the. . . encouragement held out to induce it, constrain us, unwilling
or otherwise . . . to tighten the cords which bind the Negro to his condition of
servitude-a condition which is to last, if the Apocalypse be inspired, until the
end of time;.., every bondman . . . and every freeman, hid themselves ..
(Rev. 6 ch., verses 12 to 17, inclusive).
Moran v. Davis, 18 Ga. 722, 724 (1855).
127. 36 Sneed 589 (Tenn. 1857).
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Justice McKinney felt that the social situation, expressed in
common law terms, supported the judgment against the carrier.
There could be no doubt of the correctness of the judgment in the
case upon general principles. The complexion of the case was not
varied by the fact that the conductor of the train was innocent of
any intentional wrong, and was misled by the false pass in the
possession of the slave.
In admitting a slave on the train, the agent of the road acts at
his peril and the peril of the company. He is bound to inquire
and to know that the owner has given permission and authority
to receive and carry the slave on the train; and the very act of
receiving and carrying the slave is itself a conversion. 2'
It should be noted that the situation of carriers in the South
differed appreciably from that of carriers in the North. In the
South the carriers, without any reluctance, utilized and depended
upon slave labor to operate effectually. The heavier legal burden
of strict liability in escape cases and the absence of the fellow
servant rule were outweighed in the long run by the benefits of
cheap slave labor. 2' No doubt the. latter consideration entered the
minds of the justices in the slaveholding states when they bal-
128. Id. at 591. One of the few cases holding a carrier to a less strict standard in escape
situations was that of Sill v. South Carolina R.R., 4 Rich. 154 (S.C. 1850), decided by the
South Carolina Supreme Court, in the absence of a statute governing carrier liability in
such instances. Eaton, a white man born and educated in the North, was a barkeeper in
Columbia, South Carolina. He was known as a drunkard and was often seen in the
company of slaves. Alick, the slave of Doctor Sills, was a trained apothecary and was hired
out by Sills to a drugstore in Columbia. Both Eaton and Alick were known to the ticket
agent, who would not have sold a ticket to Eaton for any slave. At that time, however,
the road allowed tickets to be purchased on the train, so Eaton, posing as Alick's owner,
took him on the train, purchased a ticket for him and took him to New York City.
Justice Withers, in rejecting Sill's argument that liability for loss through unauthorized
transit was absolute, recognized the almost impossible situation of carriers, given the
immense traffic of slaves about their masters' business. If the rule were adopted, it would
make transportation of slaves by railroads quite an impractical business. The result would
be to require exact investigation of title to such property upon peril to the company.
Railroads would be compelled to either decline business that the law commands them to
perform, as carriers of passengers, or else to encounter losses that might be oppressive, if
not ruinous. It must, therefore, be a case of negligence. Id. at 161-62. The court did state
that it was a legal duty to demand of the railroad companies the highest degree of caution
and diligence when dealing with slaves as passengers. This was due to the facility of escape
which their mode of conveyance would offer to absconding slaves, "especially if a sleepless
vigilance should give way to any degree of carelessness." Id. at 162.
129. See GENOVESE, supra note 3.
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anced the interests of these two sectors of the economy.
The final section of this Article will analyze one aspect of
equity jurisprudence: the power of an equity court to order the
return of slaves where the master's physical control over them
was lost because of questionable conduct on the part of a neigh-
bor or family member. The loss of slaves through legal process
initiated by creditors was a common event in the lives of small
holders and was the spark for a wide-ranging set of agreements
to avoid that fate. The precise issue of the power of an equity
court to order the return of slaves obtained by way of such agree-
ments is conceptually unrelated to the tort-damage topics here-
tofore discussed. However, the underlying social realities called
forth the same protective stance by the courts.
VI. EQUITY: SPECIFIc DELIVERY
[Tlhere is no standard by which the price of affection can be
adjusted, and no scale to graduate the feelings of the heart
... . - Taylor, C. J., Williams v. Howard, 3 Mur. (N.C.) 74,
80 (1819).
One of the best examples of the difficulties encountered by the
courts in their attempts to reconcile the received English juris-
prudence with the institution of slavery was in determining the
extent of the power of an-equity court to decree the specific deliv-
ery of slaves. Hard times' and the growth of a mercantile/lending
segment in an agricultural economy gave rise to innumerable
situations in which the owner of few slaves was faced with the
permanent loss of his bondsmen. To avoid attachment by credi-
tors, owners would "sell" one or more of their slaves to a friend
or neighbor, usually at a price substantially below the current
market value, with an oral agreement that the slave would be
"resold" to the owner once his financial situation was more se-
cure. When the friend refused later to honor the agreement, the
owner sought a decree of specific performance. Similar agree-
ments were made with friends and neighbors who, by prearranged
bidding agreements, would purchase the owner's slaves at a low
1,30. The depression of the 1840's, which coincided with the increased. activity in this
area of the law, resulted in many small slaveholders succumbing to the pressures of
creditors. Id. at 408.
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price at a sheriff's sale initiated by creditors. A creditor often
agreed to "resell" a slave sold to him at a low price by a debtor.
Such an agreement prevented the slave from being attached by
other creditors, and in reality the "sale" merely served as security
for the underlying debt. These agreements also gave rise to peti-
tions in equity. On a more personal level, the issue was raised
by oral promises to make an eventual gift of a slave cared for or
raised by a relative while the owner was in bad financial straits.
To the owner of slaves temporarily deprived of them under such
circumstances, economic necessity and related social pressure
made a petition for specific delivery the obvious legal recourse.
This was especially so in light of the integral part served by slaves
in the long process of getting a crop to market or otherwise bring-
ing in needed income. In attempting to deal with these petitions
for specific delivery of slaves, the equity courts faced certain ob-
stacles. With the exception of Louisiana and Kentucky, where
slaves were classified as realty by statute,'31 slaves throughout the
South were deemed personal chattels. Traditionally, the English
equity system prohibited decrees for the specific delivery of chat-
tels, except in limited cases where the requisite pretium
affectionis could be established.3 ' Consequently, the courts were
faced with what in the early years seemed an insurmountable
conceptual obstacle.' ' They experienced the same methodologi-
cal dilemma that had confronted law courts in tort-damage situa-
tions: whether to create a parallel set of equitable principles for
slave property, or attempt to integrate such property into the
existing equity system.
In addition, the equity courts faced another obstacle. Underly-
ing any methodological difficulty was the pressing problem of
the jealousies entertained by the bar and public against any en-
croachments by the newly established equity courts on the right
to trial by jury in civil cases. Given the absence of juries in equity
131. In Louisiana, slaves were considered realty for most purposes, while in Kentucky
such classification was initially restricted to the law of descents. See G. STROUD, supra
note 17, at 11.
132. See, e.g., Pusey v. Pusey, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (Ch. 1684); Duke of Somerset v.
Cookson, 24 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ch. 1735); Fells v. Reed, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (Ch. 1796).
133. "Here there is no extraordinary injury pretended (and, indeed, none can be pre-




matters and the great time and expense involved in processing
such cases'34 the early decisions deferred the resolution of specific
delivery problems to courts of law. The resolution of the issue in
the Southern equity courts, in favor of a general rule allowing the
issuance of decrees for specific delivery of slaves, was preceded by
a unique use of the damage rules relating to conversion to accom-
plish the same result.
In a growing number of circumstances the owner of slaves,
normally a minor holder,'3 ' stood to lose control of a valued serv-
ant, as well as his entrance into the dominant -social class.
Through their powers as jurors, owners sought to dispense their
own equity in actions at law for conversion. Chancellor Johnson
of the South Carolina Court of Equity Appeals in the case of
Young v. Burton,' decided in 1841, described the practice in
detail:
When called to the bar in 1802, I found it the almost universal
practice of the law Judges to recommend to the juries, in actions
of trover, for slaves, to find for the plaintiff a greater sum than
their value, with the alternative, that the plaintiff should re-
lease the damages, on the defendant's delivering up the slaves;
and the juries entered into the spirit of it with so much zeal, that
it was not unusual to find damages to an amount of double the
value, or more, to make it the interest of the defendant to deliver
them up."7
134. As noted by Chancellor Dunkin in Young v. Burton, 1 McMul. 255, 271 (S.C. Eq.
1841):
1Allthough the court of Equity may, in complex cases, direct an issue, the
delay and expenses of such proceedings, render both the court and the parties
very reluctant to adopt them.
135. As indicated by Stampp, in 1860, 88% of the owners of slaves had less than twenty
slaves, 72" held less than ten and almost 50% held less than five. Stampp, supra note
13, at 30. Thus, in the recurring hard times due to economic depression, it was the small
holder's slaves who went to the block, not the planter's.
136. Young v. Burton, 145 1 McMul. 255 (S.C. Eq. 1841).
137. Id. at 261. It may be assumed that this or similar practices, resulting in de facto
decrees of specific delivery being issued, were fairly common in slaveholding jurisdictions
in the early years. This practice of alternative verdicts in trover was seen by courts in the
earlier decisions such as Vauters v. Elders, decided in 1818, as simple right and justice:
The law, for many years past, has been seen to look down with complacency,
and, perhaps, delight, at every endeavor to promote the principles of justice and
right, in a way which shall be least oppressive to its votaries, and, therefore, has
seemed to sanction this form of verdict. ...
2 Mill. 184, 186-87 (S.C. 1818).
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This alternative verdict could not be abused by the successful
party. In Norris v. Beckley,' 3 the plaintiff attempted to collect
labor charges for the time during which the defendant delayed in
utilizing his option, which delay eventually required a sheriff's
sale.' : The court reminded the parties and the lower court that
the result of a judgment in trover would be passage of legal title
to the defendant and warned against abuse of this unique proce-
dure.
Despite this warning, abuses of the practice continued. Finally,
they were brought to a halt in the 1818 case of McDowell v.
Murdock,"'" involving a questionable parol gift. Justice Nott,
fearing the growth of parallel legal systems due to the unique
problems associated with slave-related disputes, ruled:
The value of the property, with such damages as must necessar-
ily be supposed to flow from the conversion, is the only true
measure . . . if the jury had given only the real value of the
property, annexing the alternative, it would have been harm-
less; for it would have done the defendant no injury, and it
would not have been compulsory on either party. But to permit
a jury to give an arbitrary verdict, by way of a penalty, to com-
pel the defendant into a measure inconsistent with the nature
of the action, is not supportable on any principle of law.''
This avenue of approach now was blocked by the law courts.
Slaveowners' counsel reluctantly turned to the equity courts for
assistance in altering the traditional English rule against decrees
for the specific delivery of chattels. By combining arguments
based on the nature of the pretium affectionis exception and the
realities of the slaveholding community, counsel convinced the
138. 2 Mill. 228 (S.C. 1818).
139. Plaintiff, in an earlier trial, had received judgment against the defendant in the
amount of $800.00, to be released upon payment of $30.00 and delivery of the slaves to
plaintiff. A judgment for the amount of the hire was granted in the trial court in the
instant case.
140. 1 N. & McC. 237 (S.C. 1818).
141. Id.
Allowing this verdict to stand would be making a law for this particular class of
cases, which would be applicable to no other. It would be giving to a plaintiff,
who had prevailed upon a jury to give him an alternative verdict, a privilege
which a plaintiff in no other cases possesses, while it would impose upon the
defendant legal disabilities, to which defendants in no other cases are subjected.
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courts by 1840142 to do a complete turnabout. They were unable
to achieve this change in the respondeat superior cases because
of the adverse effect it would have on slaveowners.'4 3 Specific
delivery of slave property became the general rule, with excep-
tions where the interest of the petitioner in the slave was solely
the slave's cash value. "4
The first major case issuing such a decree and discussing all
aspects of the issue " ' was Sarter v. Gordon,'45 decided by the
Equity Court of Appeals of South Carolina in 1835. Ruben Simms
became insolvent in 1832 and certain slaves, who had been raised
by Mrs. Simms, were a portion of Simms' property subject to a
sheriff's sale. Stevens, a neighbor, purchased the slaves and
agreed to resell to the Simms family for the price paid plus minor
additional compensation, once the family was back on its feet.
After Stevens' death, Gordon, the administrator, refused to honor
the agreement because of pressing debts of Stevens and the possi-
bility of a higher market potential upon public sale. In the lower
court, Chancellor DeSaussure judicially recognized the large
number of this type of agreement," 7 held it binding on Stevens'
estate, and ordered specific performance.
142. The Supreme Court of Tennessee had in the case of Loftin v. Espy, 12 Tenn. 84
(1833) ruled in favor of the general jurisdiction of equity courts to issue decrees for the
specific delivery of slaves, but this decision was not followed in the years immediately
following its rendition.
143. See text accompanying notes 61-91 supra.
144. See note 161 and accompanying text infra.
145. Early decisions such as Caldwell v. Myers, 3 Ky. (Hardin) 560 (1808), decided by
the Kentucky Supreme Court, do not discuss the slave in his personal status or the
realities of plantation or farm life. Instead, they based their decision o~n settled English
principles concerning chattels. Id. at 563. Gradually, however, and usually in the course
of dictum after deciding the case on alternative grounds, courts began to address them-
selves to such issues. They leaned favorably towards a moderate revision of the established
principle in cases of slave property, at least those alleged to be family of domestic servants.
In Williams v. Howard, 7 N.C. 74 (1819), the court, after enforcing via the constructive
trust doctrine an oral agreement to resell a domestic servant to the original owner, on the
basis of fraud, stated:
ITIhey form an exception, for reasons equally cogent, or more so, than those
applicable to land. With respect to other chattel property, justice may be done
by damages for non-performance, and therefore equity will not interpose: But
for a faithful or family slave, endeared by a long course of service or early
association, no damages can compensate . ...
Id. at 80.
146. 2 Hill 121 (S.C. App. Eq. 1835).
147. Mr. Stevens knew he had obtained a great bargain at the sheriff's sale,
[Vol. 25:842
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Justice Harper, speaking for the court on appeal, analyzed the
case according to American precedent and the nature of the spe-
cial interests required by English law. He proceeded to view the
issue from the standpoint of the realities of the relationship be-
tween masters and domestic servants such as those of Mrs.
Simms. The tie of master and slave was one of the most intimate
relations in society. In every age the distinction had been recog-
nized between a slave brought up in his master's household and
one casually acquired. The former was of more value to the mas-
ter than he would be to a stranger. The owner better understood
his qualities and capabilities, and the slave would be more likely
to serve with "cheerfulness and fidelity." These factors were
greatly enhanced by the consideration of humanity to the slave
himself. Were not such feelings worthy of more regard than the
taste which would covet an antique altarpiece or a picture of
Titian? "We have the principle from the English decisions, but
an infinitely stronger case in which to apply it. ... "I
To avoid squabbles in the future regarding the amount of affec-
tion to be pleaded and the mode of proof necessary to warrant the
issuance of a decree,'49 Justice Harper made the exception the
. ..at the expense of a large family, and seems to have been induced by kind
feelings to let the children of the family have the slaves at the same price...
given, and who were to pay him in this act of beneficience. . . .In transactions
of this kind, it is understood that time is not of the essence ....
Id. at 126. To bring the issue to a head for resolution by the full Equity Court of Appeals,
Chancellor DeSaussure made a general ruling in favor of specific performance jurisdiction
in slave cases.
148. Id. at 135.
149. Chancellor Harper, in the case of Horry v. Glover, 2 Hill 515 (S.C. App. Eq. 1837)
indicated the administrative difficulties inherent in a case by case approach, based upon
adherence to the concept of pretium affectionis, thus necessitating a general rule:
IHiow are these circumstances to be ascertained by evidence? By what rule will
you fix the length of time that a slave shall have belonged to his owner, so that
he may be supposed to have formed a particular attachment for him? Will you
go into evidence of the slave's character and qualities to determine whether they
are such as give him a peculiar value to the feelings of his owner, or to have
formed a probable inducement to the purchaser in making a contract for him?
Suppose him to be one of a family of slaves still in the owner's possession, and
who are rendered of less value by his loss [sic], (which is often the case), will
you fix the degree of relationship-such as that of a parent or child, husband or
wife-which would authorize the court to interfere? Such a construction would
tend greatly to litigation and afford room for great looseness of discretion.
Id. at 524.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
general rule. Slaves were moral and intellectual beings, having
qualities infinitely diversified. In every case where specific slaves
were contracted for, it would be assumed that the contract was
made with a view to their peculiar qualities.
I am not to shrink from enforcing a well-settled principle of law,
because it may lead to unforeseen consequences. I believe these
consequences will follow, and I am prepared to lay it down as a
general rule that a bill will lie for the specific delivery of slaves,
as for the specific performance of a contract for the sale of land;
and in saying this, I believe I am giving effect to the law, accord-
ing to its true meaning.1' )
Justice Harper, while recognizing the social necessity of a gen-
eral rule, nevertheless stated an equally compelling exception in
cases where the petitioning party was a social parvenu such as the
slave trader.'
If it appeared that the purchaser contracted for the slaves as
merchandise to sell again . . . this would be merely a matter in
the way of trade, and in such case it is certain that complete
justice might be done by a compensation in damages. But the
general rule must be as I have stated.'52
In South Carolina, as elsewhere," ' the creditors' bar refused to
accept this new general principle. They continually appealed de-
crees on the basis of the English rule, or insisted that earlier cases
150. Sarter v. Gordon, 2 Hill 121, 136 (S.C. App. Eq. 1835).
151. Professional slave traders were held in very low esteem by slaveholders, who saw
them as social parvenus at best. However, as noted by Stampp:
The majority of slaveholders agreed that only the most calamitous circumstan-
ces could justify dealings with professional traders. In fact, it was hard to find
a master who would admit that he sold slaves as a deliberate 'speculation'-a
business transaction whose object was a profit-rather than as an unhappy last
resort. Perhaps only a few masters wished to regard slaves as marketable com-
modities, though some certainly did, but most of them had in their lexicons an
extremely broad definition of 'necessity'. Somehow their necessities kept the
auctioneers busy and enabled the traders to conduct a brisk traffic in human
flesh.
STAMPP, s opra note 13, at 240.
152. Sarter v. Gordon, 2 Hill 121, 137 (S.C. App. Eq. 1835). This exception to the new
general rule applied to all petitioners whose sole interest in the slave was its eventual cash
value. See, e.g., Bryan & Richardson v. Robert, 1 Strob. 334 (S.C. App. Eq. 1846).
Imortgagerl; Savery v. Spence, 13 Ala. 561 (1848) [bounty hunter].




involving slaves actually had been limited to domestic servants.,"
The decision finally putting the issue to rest in most of the slave-
holding jurisdictions was rendered by the Court of Equity Ap-
peals of South Carolina several years later in the case of Young
v. Burton.'' '
The facts as given by the court are extremely sketchy. They tell
us only that Burton was in possession of a slave belonging to
Young and that the latter, by a bill in equity, sought the slave's
return. The circuit court had dismissed the bill on the ground
that such remedy did not lie in the case of slaves.
Chancellor Johnson, speaking for eight of the court's nine
members, began by stating his own view that the earlier cases of
Sarter v. Gordon,'56 and Horry v. Glover'7 had settled the issue
with finality. A full consideration was required, however, because
the bench as well as the bar continually reviewed the question.,'
After clearing away bothersome precedents,' 5 the chancellor dis-
cussed the history of public opinion on the power of courts to force
delivery of slaves by convertors. While the cases had not been
preserved, the legal profession knew that courts of chancery had
habitually entertained bills for the specific delivery of domestic
servants. However, public opinion had not been satisfied with
such limited relief, Johnson continued, and noted the unique
154. Domestic servants were the factual basis for Chancellor Harper's broad ruling in
Gordon.
155. 1 McMul. 255 (S.C. Eq. 1841).
156. 2 Hill 121 (S.C. App. Eq. 1835).
157. 2 Hill 515 (S.C. App. Eq. 1837).
158. In that case [Sarter v. Gordon] the opinion . . . is distinctly and clearly
expressed, with the intent to settle the law; and such I know to have been the
intention of the whole Court, then consisting of Mr. Justice O'Neall, Chancellor
Harper and myself. . . . It has, however, again been revived, and the import-
ance of the question, and the diversity of opinion, which exists in this Court,
renders it proper, that it should be reconsidered.
Young v. Burton, 1 McMul. 251, 258 (S.C. Eq. 1841).
159. Johnson noted earlier decisions in the state wherein the issue was either avoided
or simply referred to while the case was decided on other grounds. These cases, he ex-
plained, in an amazing bit of judicial confession, were decided immediately after the
organization of an equity court of appeal consisting of three judges drawn from the law
bench, of which he was a member. They were explained away on the basis that the
members of that court had few traces of the fine points of equity jurisprudence in their
minds after more than a decade's service on the law side; they were decided without
reference to the obvious distinction between slaves and other chattels and those directly
addressing the issue were based "on servile adherence to the English rule." Id. at 261.
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procedure of alternative verdicts in trover cases. Having estab-
lished public support for a favorable ruling, the chancellor re-
viewed the English decisions allowing the specific delivery of
unique chattels, those where the pretium affectionis was estab-
lished, and those relating to land contracts. He concluded that
the principles of those cases applied directly and irresistably to
the cases of slaves generally.
If the law would acknowledge a purchaser's attachment to a
barren sandhill, the special value of an honest, able, and diligent
slave also should be recognized. To the argument that money
damages were an adequate remedy, the following reply was made:
[T]here are no two human beings, black, white or mixed, which
are exactly alike in all their moral, physical, or acquired quali-
ties; and although the peculiar qualities of a slave may be well
known and appreciated by the owner, he may be unable to fur-
nish proof of their existence. When one goes into the market
[place] to purchase a slave, or a number of them, his selection
is determined by the best evidence he can obtain in reference
to these qualities. And why should he not have them in specie?
Why should he be sent to the courts of law and told with the
damages you recover in trover, you may go to the professional
dealer and supply their place.""
Aside from the unpleasant task of replacing a known quantity
with an unknown one, the chancellor noted the disastrous eco-
nomic difficulties that would be faced by a plantation owner if
he had to replace one of his skilled slaves such as blacksmith,
hostler, driver, or wagoner during midseasonytl In addition, the
owner would have to suffer the emotional loss of a "faithful and
kind old nurse;" the body servant who has watched over genera-
tions of sick beds; the faithful slave who has followed the rise and
fall of the family fortunes; and last but not least "the more hum-
ble, but equally faithful and devoted field slave, who recommends
himself to the regard of his owner by implicit obedience to all his
160. Id. at 262-63.
161. As it was, planters each year expended large amounts of money for the services of
outside skilled workers and tradesmen, thus increasing the importance of whatever skilled
slaves were a part of the plantation work force. To a small slaveholder of limited means,
the loss could be, and on many occasions was, catastrophic. On this point, see E.
GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL EcONOMY OF SLAVERY, 52-53 (1967).
[Vol. 25:842
SLAVERY
commands."'' 2 These considerations were not imaginary wander-
ings on his part, continued Johnson, but were drawn from real
life:
The existence and force of the attachments are not susceptible
of higher proof than is found in the well known fact, that when
the owner is compelled, by pecuniary embarassment, to sell his
property, the slave is usually the last article that is put under
the hammer.' 3
The court rejected any suggestions that its ruling be limited to
instances where the owner could actually establish some special
interest in the slave. It held that the mere allegation and proof
of ownership was sufficient to warrant the decree. Most fre-
quently the attachment of a master to a slave grew out of a
thousand little incidents, of which he was hardly conscious. It was
not practical to prove that one had a particular liking for a horn
or snuff box, but it was inferred from circumstances. So it must
be in regard to slaves:
I have taxed my powers of reflection to their full extent, to
conjure up one solitary reason why one who has been deprived
of his slave, should not be permitted to determine for himself,
whether he should have him again, or his value in money." '
Having rendered the decision, Chancellor Johnson acknowl-
edged the jealousies entertained against the Court of Chancery.
He admitted that every assumption of jurisdiction or application
of an accepted principle to a new situation would be denounced
by the bar as an usurpation and an infringement on the right to
trial by jury. In the face of such a barrage, Chancellor Johnson
would look to the public for support:
[TIell the people of this state that a stranger may enter upon
you, and carry off your female slave, the mother of a dozen
children, otherwise the humblest of your gang; that he may
select from them the most valuable, and drive them all off en
masse, and that at law your only remedy is damages, estimated
at their marketable value, and I know nothing of their feelings
162. Young v. Burton, 1 McMul. 251, 264 (S.C. Eq. 1841).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 265.
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and opinions, if they would not arm themselves, and prepare to
oppose force to force.' 5
Thus, when squarely faced with the realities of a social and
economic structure inextricably involved with the slave labor sys-
tem, the courts of the ante-bellum South declared all slaves to be
unique chattels, susceptible to a decree of specific delivery upon
proof of ownership alone. The reasoning of Chancellors Harper
and Johnson was eventually followed throughout the slaveholding
jurisdictions, with the exception of the state of Georgia.66
VII. CONCLUSION
The process of integrating slave property into a developing,
common law oriented system of private law was a continual one,
affecting all areas. The judges of the South, like their counter-
parts in the North, were given the task of adapting the common
law to the needs of their changing economic and social milieu.
With the passage of each decade, the South's "peculiar institu-
tion" brought forth increasing problems, and the populace looked
to the courts for the solutions. Courts in the South, as in the
North, were a vital force in the society in which they functioned
and were responsive to the needs of such societies. In the thou-
sands of cases decided while the institution of slavery existed in
the South, the courts responded, by molding the pliable system
of the common law to fit the needs of a slave and cotton economy,
thus serving as protectors of the interests of the slaveholding
community.
165. Id. at 267.
166. In the state of Georgia, no doubt due to the existence of a statute providing for a
summary recovery in suits seeking restitution of slaves wrongfully taken by violence or
seduction, the courts, in cases involving specific delivery, required that the petitioner
establish a special interest in the slave prior to the issuance of a decree. See Dudley v.
Mallery, 4 Ga. 52 (1848).
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